Countering Hypersonic Weapons- Threat Analysis, Defence Challenges, and Strategic Countermeasures
Published 04 Jun 2026 , Council for Strategic Affairs, USA
The emergence of hypersonic weapons represents one of the most significant disruptions to strategic stability and missile defence architecture since the Cold War. These weapons, capable of travelling at speeds exceeding Mach 5, while maintaining manoeuvrability throughout their flight profiles, are challenging every aspect of traditional missile-defence paradigms.
Hypersonic weapons fall into three primary categories: Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs) powered by advanced air-breathing engines such as scramjets; Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) that ride atop ballistic boosters before separating and gliding at extreme speeds through the upper atmosphere; and the emerging space-based delivery concepts including Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS) that combine satellite-like orbital trajectories with hypersonic re-entry capabilities.
The strategic implications of these weapons are significant. Unlike traditional ballistic missiles that follow predictable parabolic trajectories, hypersonic weapons can execute unpredictable course changes throughout their flight, rendering conventional intercept solutions based on pre-calculated impact points ineffective. The compression of decision timelines from detection to impact to mere minutes fundamentally alters the operational calculus for defenders and creates unprecedented escalation risks.
This article provides an analysis of the hypersonic threat landscape, examines the theoretical and technological challenges confronting defenders, surveys current and emerging defence systems designed to counter these threats, and documents country-specific defence measures that are being implemented across the globe.
Understanding Hypersonic Threats
Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs) represent a novel and significant threat in modern warfare. In contrast to ballistic missiles, which adhere to a predetermined trajectory, HCMs are propelled by specialised engines called scramjets. These engines enable missiles to travel at extremely high speeds within the atmosphere. Notably, HCMs exhibit greater fuel efficiency and an extended range compared to conventional rocket-powered missiles. They are capable of exceeding speeds of Mach 5 and manoeuvring during flight while maintaining low altitudes to evade radar detection. The scramjet engine utilises atmospheric oxygen, thereby reducing the weight of the missile and enhancing its efficiency. For instance, Russia’s Zircon missile can achieve speeds of Mach 9 and cover distances exceeding 1,000 km, whereas India’s hypersonic missile is claimed to reach Mach 8 and travel over 1,500 km. The United States is also actively developing HCMs. These missiles can be launched from terrestrial, maritime, and aerial platforms, complicating their detection prior to launch. Their low and rapid flight profiles afford minimal warning time and challenge radar systems.
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) represent the pinnacle of hypersonic weaponry. An HGV is initially propelled by a conventional missile booster, after which it detaches and glides at high velocity towards its target. HGVs can alter their trajectory mid-flight, making them difficult to track and intercept. Upon separation from the booster, the HGV glides through the atmosphere, utilising aerodynamic lift to maintain its altitude. It can execute lateral movements, adjust its altitude, and modify its course, thereby rendering traditional missile defence systems ineffective. China’s DF-17 is the first operational HGV, achieving speeds of Mach 10 and covering distances of 1,800–2,500 kilometres. Russia’s Avangard can reach speeds of Mach 20 and carry nuclear warheads. North Korea has also conducted tests of HGV technology like those of China, raising concerns regarding its proliferation. Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) present significant detection challenges owing to their high velocity. As these vehicles traverse, their surfaces experience extreme heating, resulting in the formation of a plasma layer that obstructs the radar signals. Consequently, conventional radar tracking is ineffective, necessitating the use of infrared and multispectral sensors.
Space-based hypersonic weapons pose a substantial threat and employ systems such as Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS), which differ from traditional missiles. FOBS can enter a partial orbit around the Earth and launch attacks from unexpected vectors, thereby circumventing conventional missile defences. This concept originated in the Soviet Union and is currently utilised by Russia and China. The operational capabilities of Russia’s Sarmat missile and China’s 2021 test have raised concerns among Western defence experts. Space-based hypersonic weapons represent a significant challenge, as existing missile warning systems are inadequate for tracking them owing to their ability to approach from any direction and alter their trajectory. This development challenges the established defence strategies. Furthermore, legal complexities arise from the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits nuclear weapons in orbit but does not explicitly ban conventional weapons from traversing space, complicating the establishment of regulations for space-based military operations.
Challenges in Countering Hypersonic Weapons
Countering hypersonic weapons is a formidable task. The unpredictability of a hypersonic vehicle’s trajectory, owing to its ability to alter its course, complicates interception efforts using conventional methods. Hypersonic vehicles push the boundaries of technology, imposing stringent demands on interceptors in terms of thermal management, structural integrity, and propulsion. An interceptor must engage the threat at an optimal moment and possess sufficient energy to track its manoeuvres. Conventional defence strategies for ballistic threats require revaluation in the context of hypersonic threats. Intercepting hypersonic weapons during their boost phase is particularly challenging because they are launched from deep within adversarial territories or from mobile platforms, coupled with a brief boost phase. The glide phase offers more time for interception than the terminal phase; however, it occurs at velocities and altitudes that pose significant challenges for the interceptors.
The technology required to counter hypersonic weapons encompasses multiple facets of missile defence systems. The detection and tracking of these threats remain formidable challenges. Hypersonic weapons operate at altitudes that are not well-suited for ground-based radars, which are optimised for lower altitudes, or space-based systems, which are designed for higher altitudes. The plasma sheath presents additional complications. At hypersonic speeds, the air surrounding the vehicle heats up, forming a plasma layer that obstructs the radar detection. This necessitates the use of infrared sensors or specialised radar systems, each with its own inherent limitations. Interceptor technology must achieve feats that were once deemed impossible. A glide-phase interceptor must attain hypersonic speeds, accurately position itself, and execute rapid manoeuvres against swiftly moving targets. The velocities involved can exceed Mach 15, leaving minimal time for human intervention. Thermal management is another critical challenge in this regard. Both the threat and interceptor are subjected to extreme heat. Thermal protection increases the weight and reduces the agility of interceptors. The development of materials and cooling systems capable of withstanding these conditions while maintaining sensor and guidance functionality remains an active area of research.
Kill Chain Compression and Implications
The kill chain constitutes a sequence of steps designed to neutralise threats. This process encompasses threat identification, tracking, differentiation from other objects, decision-making, interceptor deployment, and neutralisation. In the context of conventional ballistic missiles, this procedure typically requires several minutes, thereby allowing for adjustments and the implementation of multiple defensive measures. However, the advent of hypersonic weapons has significantly accelerated this process, thereby altering missile defence dynamics. A hypersonic weapon travelling at Mach 10 provides a defender located 1,000 kilometres away with merely five to six minutes from detection to impact. This reduced timeframe renders human decision-making inadequate, necessitating fully automated systems, which raises concerns regarding rules of engagement, authority, and the potential for inadvertent escalation. The reduced duration of the kill chain also impacts deterrent strategies. Traditional deterrence relies on the threat of substantial retaliation, even post-attack. Hypersonic weapons, capable of striking critical targets swiftly, undermine this threat and may incentivize pre-emptive actions during crises. The implications for theatre commanders are immediate, decisions regarding protection and defence must be executed within minutes, necessitating constant readiness, which is both costly and stressful for the crew. Defending against these rapid weapons, therefore, requires novel strategies and organizational structures.
Anti-Hypersonic Defence Systems
Terminal-Phase Defences
Terminal-phase defences represent the final opportunity to intercept hypersonic weapons before impact. This task is challenging because of the velocity and manoeuvrability of the weapon. Nevertheless, it constitutes the most advanced layer of defence currently available. Certain systems are being adapted for this purpose, such as the SM-6 Block IB missile employed by the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence System. This system utilises radar and guidance to target hypersonic weapons during their terminal phase. In recent evaluations, such as the March 2025 Flight Test Other-40 (Stellar Banshee), a collaborative missile defence exercise conducted by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the U.S. Navy on March 24, 2025, near Kauai, Hawaii, the capability of Aegis Combat System to track and simulate engagement with a live, advanced manoeuvring hypersonic threat was successfully demonstrated. These tests have effectively shown the use of satellite data in tracking and engaging hypersonic targets. Nonetheless, intercepting during the terminal phase remains a last-ditch defence strategy, offering limited chances for re-engagement if the first attempt fails.
The Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system is primarily designed to intercept ballistic missiles. It is equipped with a radar capable of detecting threats from a considerable distance. The THAAD interceptor is proficient in engaging targets beyond and within the upper atmosphere. However, current models face challenges when addressing rapidly moving hypersonic threats. The Russian S-500 system, operational since 2021 near Moscow, has the capability to intercept hypersonic targets travelling at speeds of up to Mach 20 and at altitudes of up to 200 kilometres. It operates in conjunction with the S-400 and S-300 systems to provide comprehensive coverage; however, its effectiveness against genuine hypersonic targets remains unverified.
The Glide Phase Interceptors
Interception during the glide phase is considered the optimal strategy for neutralising hypersonic glide vehicles, as this phase is prolonged and susceptible, thereby offering multiple opportunities for interception. The Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) program, a collaborative initiative between the United States and Japan, represents the most advanced interceptor currently under development. It is launched from Aegis-equipped destroyers and employs a three-stage interceptor with a re-ignitable motor to track the moving targets. A hit-to-kill vehicle equipped with advanced sensors guides it to impact at velocities exceeding Mach 10. In April 2026, Northrop Grumman was awarded a $475.3 million contract to expedite GPI development, with the aim of achieving initial capability by December 2029 with 12 missiles and full capability by December 2032 with 24 interceptors. Japan was responsible for developing the second-stage motor and steering system. Israel’s Arrow 4 interceptor, developed in collaboration with the United States, is also significant for glide-phase defence capabilities. It utilises artificial intelligence and machine learning for guidance, which is crucial for rapid engagement. Live trials commenced in 2025, and potential deployment is anticipated in 2026.
Space Based Tracking and Sensors
Effective defence against hypersonic weapons necessitates continuous global tracking, which cannot be provided by ground-based radar systems. Space-based sensors are the only viable means of tracking hypersonic threats from launch to termination, supplying the data required to guide interceptors.
The Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) is the primary initiative of the United States for monitoring hypersonic threats. HBTSS satellites are engineered to detect and track hypersonic threats within the Earth’s atmosphere, a task that is more challenging than tracking missiles in space. These sensors are oriented towards the Earth to monitor missiles and relay data to missile defence systems. Project Maverick, scheduled for 2027, aims to demonstrate the capability to counter hypersonic threats by utilizing data from both aerial and space-based sensors. It will track a hypersonic vehicle along the U.S. East Coast, employing a system to process data and facilitate remote engagement in the research process. If successful, it could provide an interim defence against hypersonic threats while more advanced systems are being developed. The Space Development Agency’s (SDA’s) Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) supports the tracking of the hypersonic threat using satellites positioned in a low Earth orbit. The SDA tracking layer initially detects threats, whereas the HBTSS layer offers precise tracking of interceptors. Collectively, these systems establish a space-based tracking framework that is essential for hypersonic defence.
Directed Energy and Non-Kinetic Defences
Directed energy weapons, such as lasers and microwaves, have advantages against hypersonic threats. Lasers operate at the speed of light, eliminating the need to match hypersonic speeds, and are cost-effective. Laser’s encounter challenges, such as maintaining a beam on a moving target, however, technological advancements are aiding in overcoming these challenges. Numerous countries are developing laser systems for anti-hypersonic applications. High-power microwave systems target the electronics of hypersonic vehicles, disrupting their control systems, which can result in the vehicle missing its target without being destroyed. The U.S. army has tested mobile microwave systems, and other nations are developing similar technologies.
Electronic warfare plays a crucial role in countering hypersonic threats to national security. Ukraine’s Lima system is said to disrupt the satellite guidance of Russia’s Kinzhal missile, thereby causing it to deviate from its intended target. This is effective because many hypersonic weapons depend on GPS for accuracy, and interference with these signals can reduce their accuracy.
Future Concepts and Developments
Space-based interceptors are a significant concept for addressing hypersonic threats. By deploying interceptors in space, hypersonic weapons can be engaged at an early stage before these weapons can evade or employ countermeasures. This approach overcomes the limitations of ground-based systems. In November 2025, the U.S. Space Force awarded contracts for the development of these interceptors, with Lockheed Martin spearheading the initiative. The objective is to intercept hypersonic glide vehicles and emerging ICBMs at an early stage of their flight. These interceptors must operate below an altitude of 120 km and possess rapid propulsion capabilities. The U.S. Space Force is seeking innovative solutions in three areas: powerful boosters, advanced sensors, and integrated space vehicles. However, space-based interceptors face challenges such as prohibitive costs, sustainability, and space debris issues. Additionally, concerns exist regarding the weaponization of space and its implications for arms control and peace.
AI-enabled battle management
Defending against hypersonic weapons necessitates rapid decision-making beyond human capabilities. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning are essential tools in this context. AI systems can integrate data from various sensors to generate real-time threat assessments. Machine learning can predict threats and rapidly suggest or execute decisions based on the predictions. This capability is vital for effective hypersonic defence systems.
The Pentagon’s Golden Dome missile defence strategy incorporates artificial intelligence (AI) as a fundamental component. Rather than depending on centralised command centres, which are susceptible to disruption, the Golden Dome employs a network of sensors and shooters. AI-enabled nodes within this network can autonomously make decisions based on shared information. This methodology mitigates vulnerabilities and enhances defences against electronic and cyber threats during hypersonic attacks.
The Arrow 4 interceptor, developed by Israel, exemplifies the application of AI in hypersonic defence systems. It utilises AI to guide missiles in scenarios where the reaction time is limited to a few seconds. The system is required to track rapidly moving targets and distinguish genuine threats from the decoys. Machine learning facilitates the adaptation of systems to emerging threats that traditional systems cannot anticipate.
Integrated Layered Defence Architecture
No singular defence system can provide comprehensive protection against all hypersonic threats. An effective defence necessitates an Integrated Comprehensive Layered Defence (ICLD) system, which amalgamates pre-launch and post-launch capabilities, employs both physical and non-physical methods, and encompasses all phases of a hypersonic weapon’s trajectory. Pre-launch capabilities aim to prevent or disrupt hypersonic weapon launches, including attacks on launch sites, cyber assaults on control systems, electronic warfare, and missile facility strikes. Pre-launch operations require robust intelligence to identify mobile launchers and time-sensitive targets. Post-launch capabilities encompass active defence systems that intercept during the boost phase from space or air, the glide phase from ships or land, and the terminal phase from various missile systems. Energy weapons can also engage threats in a cost-effective way. Each layer contributes to the overall defence, and no single layer needs to be flawless for the system to function effectively. Non-physical layers support physical interceptors by diminishing the efficacy of hypersonic weapons without destroying them. Electronic warfare can jam signals, high-power microwaves can disrupt electronics, and cyber capabilities can alter the mission data. Incorporating these non-physical effects into a layered system enhances the likelihood of a successful defence and reduces reliance on costly interceptors.
Country Wise Defence Measures
United States
The United States employs multi-layered approach to counter hypersonic threats, emphasising layered defence, space-based sensing, and accelerated interceptor development. The Missile Defence Agency’s Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) program is central to U.S. glide-phase defence, with the SM-6 Block IB for terminal-phase defence and Project Maverick demonstrating near-term counter-hypersonic integration.
The Golden Dome initiative is set to allocate $185 billion towards the enhancement of missile defence systems, marking the most significant upgrade since the Strategic Defence Initiative. This program aims to establish a comprehensive system that comprises sensors, interceptors, and control mechanisms. It will incorporate space-based sensors, novel interceptors, and energy weapons to achieve this goal. For 2027, a budget request of $17.9 billion has been made to expedite the development of sensors and interceptors. The space-based sensing component includes the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) constellation, the Space Development Agency’s tracking system, and the Discrimination Space Sensor program. Concurrently, the United States is advancing long-range strike systems, such as hypersonic weapons, to neutralise enemy launches pre-emptively. The Low-Cost Defeat initiative seeks to produce cost-effective interceptors to maintain robust defences during prolonged attacks, thereby preventing the depletion of interceptors against hypersonic threats.
Japan
Owing to its geographical location and alliance with the United States, Japan is prioritising hypersonic defence. As an island nation close to countries possessing hypersonic weapons, Japan is rapidly advancing its counter-hypersonic capabilities. The Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) co-development program represents Japan’s most substantial investment in this domain. Japan is investing $368 million in collaboration with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to develop components for the GPI, which will be deployed on Aegis destroyers and new Aegis System-Equipped Vessels (ASEVs). The first ASEV is anticipated to become operational by 2027, followed by the second in 2028. Additionally, Japan is accelerating the deployment of its Improved Type 03 Chu-SAM Kai missile, targeting deployment by 2026. This underscores Japan’s commitment to advancing its indigenous technology while collaborating with allies. Japan perceives the current security environment as the most precarious since World War II, citing threats from North Korea, Russia-China cooperation, and China’s hypersonic arsenal. Consequently, Japan plans to augment its defence expenditure to two percent of its GDP by 2027 in response to these threats.
Russia
Russia’s hypersonic defence strategy encompasses both offensive and defensive measures. The S-500 Prometheus system, operational since 2021, is a cornerstone of Russia’s defence capabilities. It is purported to intercept hypersonic targets travelling at speeds of up to Mach 20 and altitudes of 200 km. The S-500 system represents a sophisticated defence architecture that incorporates various radar systems, including the 91N6A(M) acquisition radar, 96L6-TsP target tracking radar, and 76T6/77T6 engagement radars. This configuration ensures comprehensive 360-degree coverage and the capability to simultaneously track multiple ballistic targets. The 77N6-N and 77N6-N1 interceptors were engineered for anti-ballistic and hypersonic missions, whereas the 40N6M missile was designated for long-range air defence. Concurrently, Russia is advancing the development of the S-550 system, which emphasises countering space threats and enhancing defence against orbital weapons. Collectively, the S-500 and S-550 systems are anticipated to play central roles in Russia’s future aerospace defence strategy, with potential adaptations for naval applications. Notably, Russia allocates more resources to offensive hypersonic systems than to defensive ones. Systems such as the Avangard HGV, Kinzhal missile, and Zircon missile exemplify a deterrence strategy predicated on offensive capabilities, reminiscent of Cold War-era nuclear doctrines.
India
India’s Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) is actively engaged in a hypersonic program that encompasses both offensive and defensive dimensions. India’s strategic approach prioritises self-reliance and indigenous development, with investments in scramjet technology, thermal systems, and interceptor systems. The hypersonic defence initiative is integrated into a broader Ballistic Missile Defence program, which encompasses the development of 12 distinct hypersonic missile types under initiatives such as Project Vishnu. These include offensive Hypersonic Glide Vehicles and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles, along with anti-hypersonic defence systems. This emphasis on indigenous development mitigates reliance on foreign technology and enhances domestic defence capability. The L-Band AI Radar, Akash Teer, represents a significant advancement in hypersonic tracking, as it can detect and track hypersonic missiles at ranges of 500-800 kilometres, thereby addressing a critical technical challenge. It operates in conjunction with the Indian Air Force’s AI-driven command system to augment the situational awareness of hypersonic threats. India’s pursuit of counter-hypersonic capabilities is motivated by regional security concerns, particularly in response to China’s DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle and the potential technology transfers to Pakistan. India’s dual focus on offensive and defensive hypersonic capabilities aims to sustain credible deterrence at all levels of conflict.
Israel
Israel’s approach to hypersonic defence is informed by its unique threat environment and experience with missile attack. The Arrow missile defence system, developed in collaboration with the United States, constitutes the uppermost tier of Israel’s air and missile defence infrastructure. The Arrow 4 interceptor, which represents the most advanced counter-hypersonic system, is nearing operational readiness. The Arrow 4 system is engineered to counter advanced missile threats, including re-entry vehicles and hypersonic glide vehicles, utilising artificial intelligence and machine learning for guidance and threat prediction. Testing commenced in 2025, and operational readiness is anticipated by 2026. The expedited development of this system was expedited by insights gained from Iranian and Houthi missile attacks, which exposed the limitations of older defence systems against emerging missile technologies. Israel’s multi-layered defence architecture includes Arrow 3 for exo-atmospheric threats, Arrow 4 for endo-atmospheric threats, David’s Sling for medium-range threats, Iron Dome for short-range rocket interception, and Iron Beam, which employs laser technology for a cost-efficient defence. Additionally, Rafael’s SkySonic interceptor provides an extra layer of defence against hypersonic threats. The Arrow 4 initiative represents a collaborative endeavour between Israel and the United States, involving shared financial and risk responsibilities and potentially serving as a model for future cooperative projects.
Europe and NATO
Europe and NATO are addressing hypersonic threats through technological advancement and strategic coordination. NATO’s strategic assessments advocate for the development of both offensive and defensive capabilities. The TWISTER project in Europe aims to establish a space-based warning and interception system for hypersonic threats. The AUKUS partnership, comprising Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, concentrates on hypersonic missile research and technology exchange. The HyFliTE project facilitates the sharing of testing facilities and information among these nations, with multiple tests scheduled for 2028. European nations are also investing in hypersonic defence capabilities, with France actively researching hypersonic weapons and contributing to NATO defence strategies. The United Kingdom participates in AUKUS and other initiatives, although budgetary constraints pose challenges.
China
Beijing is investing significantly in technology and resources to enhance its defence capabilities against hypersonic missiles. This initiative seeks to equal or surpass the missile defence systems of other nations, thereby altering the global security landscape. China’s strategic approach emphasises the disruption of adversary sensors and the safeguarding of its military assets. The country analyses electronic signals and radar patterns from recent conflicts and employs machine learning to refine its defence system. This enables adaptation to and mitigation of complex hypersonic threats in the future. To counter these threats, China employs a layered defence strategy that segments the battle area into midcourse, near-space glide, and terminal defence zones. If a threat penetrates the initial layers, it is engaged by naval interceptors, missiles, and energy weapons. Success hinges on the ability to track threats from inception to conclusion. Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) operate at altitudes between 30 and 100 km, posing challenges for ground-based radar detection. Consequently, China has established a network of sensors in space, near space, and on the ground. The “Tongxin Jishu Shiyan” (TJS) satellites provide early warning capabilities like those of the United States system. The Huoyan-1 satellites monitor the critical areas for missile launches. Additional satellites, such as Qianshao-3, collect signals to support the defence systems. Furthermore, China plans to deploy numerous low-Earth-orbit satellites to enhance communication. Advanced artificial intelligence is used to detect and track enemy movements, including the real-time monitoring of ships, aircraft, and bombers, to bolster defence networks.
Recent advancements in ground-based air defence radar systems have focused on the deployment of mobile, advanced three-dimensional Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars. These radars are integrated at the brigade level and synthesise data from multiple sensors, thereby complicating the evasion of detection by fast and low-visibility objects. The Type 610A radar with a range of 4,000 km, is crucial for long-range tracking. Additionally, China has developed land-based interceptors designed to neutralise incoming missiles and hypersonic targets at high altitudes. The HQ-19 system, analogous to the United States’ Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, was developed in the late 1990s and successfully evaluated in 1999. It can intercept targets travelling at velocities of 10,000 m/s at altitudes of 200 km. Following further testing, it was certified in 2021 and entered limited service in 2018, with its public unveiling in 2024. The HQ-19 employs a two-stage rocket engine and is constructed from robust carbon fibre, enabling high-speed manoeuvres and utilising a direct impact method for threat neutralisation. It is equipped with radar and infrared sensors for guidance. The HQ-29 system represents an advanced iteration of HQ-19. first observed in June 2025 and publicly displayed in September 2025, it can target missiles at distances of up to 5,500 km and altitudes of up to 2,000 km. This system offers defence against rapid high-altitude threats and is mounted on a mobile launcher to facilitate rapid deployment and protection against attacks.
Chronology of China’s Land-Based Midcourse Intercept (GBMC) Tests
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has conducted successful land-based trials of advanced missile systems, thereby enhancing the technology employed in the HQ-19 and HQ-29 systems. Concurrently, the PLA Navy is developing the HQ-26 missile for maritime deployment. This missile, akin to the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), facilitates naval operations at greater distances from the coast. The HQ-26 can be launched from the navy’s principal vessels, such as the Type 055 and Type 052D destroyers, and can engage targets at distances up to 400 km and altitudes exceeding 200 km, with velocities approaching 10,000 m/s. It utilises radar and infrared technology to defend against adversarial missiles and hypersonic weapons. To counter rapidly moving threats, the PLA employs the HQ-9 missile series. The HQ-9B and HHQ-9B variants can intercept targets at ranges of up to 300 km and altitudes of 30–50 km, utilising radar, and infrared guidance systems. The HQ-9C, a more recent iteration, offers enhanced defensive capabilities by accommodating a greater number of missiles than its predecessor. In addition, the HQ-2020 system is engineered to neutralise high-speed threats. This system is vehicle-mounted and capable of carrying eight missiles, employing specialised technology to swiftly adjust and engage with moving targets.
Real-World Vulnerabilities and Operational Lessons
Recent conflicts have highlighted the limitations of China’s older defence system. In May 2025, during a brief conflict between India and Pakistan, known as “Operation Sindoor”, Pakistan deployed Chinese HQ-9B missile systems to counter Indian airstrikes. These systems encountered difficulties in intercepting fast and manoeuvrable missiles, such as India’s BrahMos. The HQ-9B proved inadequate in addressing these threats, prompting Pakistan to seek a more advanced HQ-19 system for enhanced security. On 24 March 2026 during aerial operations in Iran, specialised aircraft rapidly neutralised the HQ-9B systems. Similar challenges were observed in June 2025 during “Operation Rising Lion”, when adversary defences were easily circumvented. Subsequent analyses identified three primary issues: software deficiencies, susceptibility to electronic attacks, and inadequate radar data-sharing. These challenges have driven China to develop more advanced systems, including the HQ-19, HQ-29, and sea-based HQ-26.
Intercepting hypersonic missiles presents significant challenges because of their high velocity and atmospheric interactions. Artificial intelligence aids in predicting these trajectories. Researchers in Wuhan have developed an AI system that utilises radar data to forecast missile paths, providing defenders with a three-minute warning against missiles travelling at speeds of up to Mach 12. A major challenge is the heat generated by interceptors travelling at high speeds, which can impair the sensors. The HQ-19 addresses this issue by positioning sensors on the sides of the missile, away from heat.
To address aerodynamic heating issue, researchers in China have developed an exceptionally thin material that offers thermal protection while permitting wave transmission through it. This material functions effectively at temperatures exceeding 1,350°C, thereby enabling continued radar tracking and guidance.
China is also investing in non-kinetic weaponry to address multiple threats and conserve its missile resources. They have introduced the LY-1 laser weapon system for defence on both maritime and terrestrial platforms. This system can damage or destroy missiles and drones at a low cost. The naval variant is equipped with a protective dome for optics. Furthermore, China employs high-power microwave systems to incapacitate its electronic devices. NORINCO’s Hurricane systems utilise antennas to generate electromagnetic barriers that neutralise incoming threats. For strategic applications, a compact high-power microwave system, designated as TPG1000Cs, can disrupt satellites and command centres. This system is mobile and can produce intense energy bursts. The People’s Liberation Army is also exploring additional defences, such as deploying “particle or dust clouds” in the atmosphere to deflect incoming missiles. These clouds can inflict damage on fast-moving targets using minute particles. The substantial energy generated by a strong collision result in considerable damage, destabilises the vehicle, and leads to its failure. This phenomenon presents a method for neutralising hypersonic weapons without necessitating a direct missile impact. China’s air defence systems have become integral to military operations, transitioning from experimental models to standard combat tools in recent years. In March 2026, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy commissioned two new vessels, Dongguan and Anqing, as the ninth and tenth Type 055 destroyers. These 12,000-ton ships were deployed to the Eastern Theatre Command in proximity to Taiwan. Equipped with advanced radar systems and capable of carrying various interceptors, they establish a mobile defence shield to safeguard carrier groups and exert control over contested maritime regions.
On land, the PLA Air Force maintains an extensive air defence network comprising numerous HQ-9 and HQ-9B batteries as of 2024. These are integrated with high-performance radar systems to address diverse target altitudes and profiles of the targets.
Differing Strategies
The United States and China adopt distinct strategies for missile defence. Both nations recognise the susceptibility of traditional systems to contemporary weaponry; however, their approaches differ. The United States emphasises global defence and employs space-based sensors to monitor threats. They utilise the Glide Phase Interceptor to engage hypersonic weapons during their glide phase and maintain land-based systems, such as the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense. Additionally, they deploy laser systems to protect their naval assets. Conversely, China prioritises regional defence by focusing on safeguarding land-based launch sites and naval groups within nearby island chains. They have employed regional sensors to minimise tracking delays within their operational domains.
Conclusion
Hypersonic weapons present significant challenges to existing missile defence systems because of their high velocity and unpredictable trajectories, necessitating the development of novel detection and interception technologies.
Defenders encounter significant challenges in addressing threats, including issues such as plasma blackout, which complicates radar tracking, rapid decision-making processes that minimize human input, and the necessity for interceptors to match or exceed hypersonic speeds. Addressing these challenges pushes the boundaries of science, engineering, and military strategy. Robust defence requires a layered system that incorporates space sensors for continuous tracking, interceptors for midcourse and terminal defence, and additional protective measures such as directed energy and electronic warfare. It should also include mechanisms to prevent adversaries from deploying weapons. No single system can provide complete protection; only through the integration of diverse methods can a resilient defence be established against these threats. Nations are actively developing defences against hypersonic threats. The United States is investing in programs such as the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) and space-based interceptors. Japan is collaborating with the United States and accelerating its initiatives. Israel’s Arrow 4 represents the most advanced interceptor, nearing operational readiness. India is developing both offensive and defensive systems for space warfare. Russia’s S-500 and S-550 systems claim to have advanced capabilities but remain untested. China is deploying HQ 19 series of missiles with space based sensors as well as Laser, and high power microwave systems.
The strategic implications of this extend beyond technology. Hypersonic weapons reduce decision-making times, heighten risks, and challenge traditional deterrence concepts. These weapons can rapidly strike critical targets, necessitating the development of new strategies and communication frameworks. The optimal defence may involve curbing the proliferation and use of these weapons through diplomacy and strategic measures. While constructing defences is imperative, historical precedents indicate that offence–defence races are inherently unstable and costly. The global community must address the implications of hypersonic weapons before they render the current security systems obsolete.
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