All posts by Dr S Kulshrestha

Defence Analyst,Published Author,Independent Researcher
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Book Review Adam Kahane, Collaborating with the Enemy; How to Work with People You Don’t Agree with or Like or Trust. Pages 130. Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. Oakland, CA. ISBN: 978-1-62656-822-8

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(Published at IndrastraGlobal and Amazon)

Book Review

Adam Kahane, Collaborating with the Enemy; How to Work with People You Don’t Agree with or Like or Trust. Pages 130. Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. Oakland, CA. ISBN: 978-1-62656-822-8

I had met Adam during one of his visits to New Delhi. I was impressed by his simple but determined outlook on resolving conflicts. He came across as a sincere advocate of taking All the stake holders on board while resolving a complex conflict irrespective of the time taken in this process. This book is an essence of Adam’s vast personal experience in dealing with conflicts in widely different global regions.

The book is divided in to seven chapters and centres around the fundamental theme of moving ahead positively in an environment which appears to have reached an impasse. His method may enable an alternative future for stake holders even in the absence of major agreements. The stake holders need to commit to only change in prevalent conditions without shedding their stated positions or their own answers to the problem.

His concept of stretch collaboration, as different from normal collaboration, requires that three fundamental shifts be made in one’s working methodology. Firstly, in how one relates with fellow collaborators, one must stretch away from focusing narrowly on the collective goals and harmony of one’s team, and move toward embracing both conflict and connection within and beyond the team. Secondly, in how one advances one’s work, one must stretch away from insisting on clear agreements about the problem, the solution, and the plan, and move toward experimenting systematically with different perspectives and possibilities. And lastly, in how one participates in the current situation—in the role one plays—one must stretch away from trying to change what other people are doing, and move toward entering fully into the action, willing to change him/her self. Stretch collaboration is challenging because all three of these stretches require one to do the opposite of what seems natural.

This book presents a theory and practice of such a stretch collaboration. Chapter 1 explains why collaboration is necessary and why it is intrinsically difficult. Chapter 2 suggests a way to decide when to collaborate and when instead to force, adapt, or exit. Chapter 3 specifies the limitations of conventional collaboration and the narrow conditions under which it is applicable. Chapter 4 outlines stretch collaboration, and chapters 5, 6, and 7 elaborate the three stretches it entails: embracing conflict and connection, experimenting a way forward, and stepping into the game. The conclusion offers a program of exercises to put these ideas into practice.

The author acknowledges that most people find these stretches unfamiliar and uncomfortable because they demand changing ingrained behaviours. The way to learn new behaviours is to practice them over and over. And the way to start practicing is to try out a few simple new actions, pay attention to what works and what doesn’t, adjust and repeat, and build from there. Adam provides a structured program at the end of the book to practice stretch collaboration which could turn out to be a game changer in almost any type of a conflict situation be it at personal, community or national level.

A must read for everybody who wishes to seriously engage in conflict resolution and make this world a better and peaceful place in future.

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Military Domain of Cyber warfare

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(Published in CLAWS Scholar Warrior, Spring 2017, ISSN 2319-7331)

“it would require sustained action for an adversary to take down a network for a period of time which would be really debilitating, but it is possible and something that we need to guard against and be concerned about.”

      Christopher Painter, the first Cyber Coordinator for the US State Department

The extent of cyber reach from dedicated attacks on strategic assets to tactical military operations to criminal activities like ransom to inconveniencing mass populations can be gauged from the following incidents:

-One is the well-known Stuxnet strike, which required tremendous amount of resources, brainpower, and planning time. It falls under the one time gambit with major nations already on guard against similar strikes on their critical strategic facilities.

-In 2009, Conficker worm infected civil and defense establishments of many nations, for example, the UK DOD reported large-scale infection of its major computer systems including ships, submarines, and establishments of Royal Navy. The French Naval computer network ‘Intramar’ was infected, the network had to be quarantined, and air operations suspended. The German Army also reported infection of over a hundred of its computers. Conficker sought out flaws in Windows OS software and propagated by forming a botnet. It became the largest known computer worm infection by afflicting millions of computers in over 190 countries.

-There was a cyber attack in Dec 2015 against energy distribution companies in Ukraine, which led to massive power outages and affected a huge civilian population. This achieved high visibility while using an old Trojan BlackEnergy and other malware to shut down critical systems and wiping out data.

-In February 2016, the Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in Los Angeles, California was the victim of a cyber attack that encrypted its electronic data rendering its systems unusable for over a week. The hospital was forced to operate with no access to its computer systems and even had to move some patients to other hospitals. The hospital regained access to its data only after paying a fee of 40 bitcoin (approximately USD 17,000) to the attackers. Since 2014, the CryptoLocker ransom ware alone has allowed cyber criminals to collect over $100 million. The San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA) was hit with a ransom ware attack on 25 Nov 2016[1], causing fare station terminals to carry the message, “You are Hacked. ALL Data Encrypted.” The hacker sought a ransom of 100 Bitcoin (~$76000). Interestingly, the hacker behind this extortion attempt had been hacked himself revealing details about other victims as well as clues about his identity and location.

Lastly, As per a Forbes news report in November 2016, anyone could rent an army of 100,000 bots for $7500/- on the dark net. Its controllers boast that the Mirai-based botnet could unleash attacks of one Terabit per second or more[2]. Mirai malware enables computer systems running Linux into remotely controlled “bots” that can be used as part of a botnet in large-scale network attacks. It targets online consumer devices such as remote cameras and home routers. The Mirai botnet has been used in some of the largest and most disruptive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks since October 2016.

While illustrating the wide ambit under which the cyber attacks take place and the enormous cyber space that is vulnerable, the above examples also highlight the inevitable ease of threat to military and civilian space.

NATO’s CCD CoE (Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence) defines Cyberspace as:

“Cyberspace is a time-dependent set of interconnected information systems and the human users that interact with these systems”[3]. The tsunami of networked devices is expanding the cyberspace exponentially along with the requirement of data by individuals, corporations, militaries, and governments. Cyber space is becoming increasingly vulnerable to hostile and unscrupulous interjections; unfortunately, the cyber security aspects are lagging far behind the complexities of the emerging cyberspace. Various factors of cyberspace favor the attackers importantly among them are, its nebulous nature and its dynamic, which leads to ease of switching and concealing identities. These imply that it is extremely difficult to impose punitive measures against them and that such attacks would continue despite the advances in firewalls and other cyber protection systems[4].

The cyber attackers make use of the vulnerabilities like, inadequacies in software, use of secretly tampered hardware, interfaces between software and hardware like reprogrammable RAMs, online connectivity, use of user enabled settings, and access to mal-intentioned personnel who can infect directly or enable remote access. The attacker could target specific computers or carry out a general attack by delivering a payload that can activate at a given time.

To achieve clarity in the military domain of cyber space a few more definitions are necessary. Computer Network Operations (CNO) is a broad term that has both military and civilian application. It is considered one of five core capabilities under Information Operations (IO) Information Warfare by the US Military. In the Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms[5], cyber operations are defined as, “the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyber space”. As per US Joint Doctrine for Information Operations[6], CNO consists of computer network attack (CNA), computer network defense (CND) and computer network exploitation (CNE). Computer Network Attack (CNA) includes actions taken via computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy the information within computers and computer networks and/or the computers/networks themselves. Computer Network Defense (CND) includes actions taken via computer networks to protect, monitor, analyze, detect and respond to network attacks, intrusions, disruptions or other unauthorized actions that would compromise or cripple defense information systems and networks. Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) includes enabling actions and intelligence collection via computer networks that exploit data gathered from target or enemy information systems or networks. Computer Network Operations, in concert with electronic warfare (EW), is used primarily to disrupt, disable, degrade, or deceive an enemy’s command and control, thereby crippling the enemy’s ability to make effective and timely decisions, while simultaneously protecting and preserving friendly command and control.

Offensive cyber operations, from a military point of view, can be inferred as “actions taken in the cyber environment to deny the actual or potential adversary’s use of or access to information or information systems and affect their decision-making process”[7]. Offensive cyber covers the full spectrum of cyber war commencing with the covert to special operations to regular to overt strategic cyber operations. Deploying of offensive cyber capabilities against the attacker would be difficult for a nation state in view of the lack of evidence and/or identity of the aggressor.

As per US DoD, Offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) are “intended to project power by the application of force in and through cyberspace. OCO will be authorized like offensive operations in the physical domains, via an execute order (EXORD).”[8] These offensive cyber operations however, are to be used discriminatingly. “Military attacks will be directed only at military targets. Only a military target is a lawful object of direct attack.” However, military targets are defined broadly as “those objects whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a direct and concrete military advantage”.[9]

Richard Clarke  the former US National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism in his book Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It[10], defines cyber war as “Cyber war are actions by a nation state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption”. There could be various objectives of the cyber attack on military facilities, these could range from, causing damage to the software of the system and/or the network, lie hidden and inject spurious messages, deny or degrade service, disable encryption systems, alter resident data etc. etc. Cyber attacks have also been divided into two categories by some experts as syntactic attacks that act directly, and semantic attacks that aim to modify data. The syntactic attacks are directed onto IT facilities and semantic attacks target users.

A plausible strategic cyber attack scenario: As India, races towards digitization in its infrastructure and related networks, a strategic cyber attack by Pakistan (proxy China) on India, few years hence could unfold by targeting critical infrastructure in the civil and military domain. It could commence with large scale casualties (possibly in thousands) across India resulting from; disruptions, chaos, and accidents in railways and civil air traffic; collapse communications; it could cripple the road/metro traffic in cities; graduate to failures in essential services like the electric, water supply and hospital services; depending upon the level of interconnectivity lead to collapse of goods supply chain and lead to uncontrollable fires. This scenario to large extent is a distinct possibility even today.

Some salient features of strategic cyber attacks are relevant. The strategic cyber attack presents a powerful option of crippling a conventionally superior nation because of its far cheaper costs, remaining obscure thus averting conventional military strike, ability to inflict hard damage & result in long-term loss to man and material, being technologically superior, near instant launch capability at very large distances, and lastly the fact that they lie beyond the realm of any international legal framework.

However, it is also true that putting cyber weapons in the same league as nuclear weapons would not be correct because cyber weapons cannot replicate the damage potential of a nuclear weapon neither do they have the ability to assure destruction to the levels that grants them status of deterrence. As of now strategic cyber weapons have never been used and have not contributed to victory in a military war. They have yet to shift balance of power on the battlefield and accredit themselves with a certified victory.

 

China Factor: China has undertaken modernization of its cyber capabilities under what it calls Informationization. It is an effort by PLA to attain a fully networked force status. The aim of this process is to maintain information superiority and dominance against the adversary. China is developing a comprehensive computer network exploitation capability to gain strategic intelligence about likely aggressors and their allies as a precursor to winning future conflicts. The overall aim is to synergize computer network operation, electronic warfare, and kinetic strikes to cripple enemy’s information infrastructure. They have adopted “Integrated Network Electronic Warfare” (INEW)[11] that consolidates the offensive mission for both computer network attack (CNA) and EW under PLA General Staff Department’s (GSD) 4th Department (Electronic Countermeasures). The computer network defense (CND) and intelligence gathering responsibilities are assigned to the GSD 3rd Department (Signals Intelligence), and a variety of the PLA’s specialized IW militia units. The PLA is choosing its personnel from the Chinese civilian sector to induct qualified work force with specialized skills from commercial industry and academia. There are circumstantial links between China’s exploitation and theft of key intellectual property from technology-based industries via cyberspace and the PRC’s economic development goals. Dmitri Alperovitch of McAfee had compiled a report Operation Shady RAT[12] in 2011 that highlighted hacking of more than seventy-one corporations and government entities around the world by a single entity using remote access tool (RAT) from 2006 to 2011. Mandiant’s 2013 report APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units[13], claims that the PLA’s cyber unit 61398 is most likely behind such exploitation on behalf of the PRC’s military and economic goals.

Conclusion

Taking cognizance of enhanced Chinese cyber warfare capabilities US Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace[14], 2011 had outlined five strategic initiatives:

– Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train, and equip so that DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace’s potential.

– Employ new defense operating concepts to protect DoD networks and systems.

– Partner with other U.S. government departments and agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-of-government cyber security strategy.

– Build robust relationships with U.S. allies and international partners to strengthen collective cyber security.

– Leverage the nation’s ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation.

The US DoD in its cyber strategy for 2015[15] has set five strategic goals for its cyberspace missions:

– Build and maintain ready forces and capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations.

– Defend the DoD information network, secure DoD data, and mitigate risks to DoD missions.

– Be prepared to defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. vital interests from disruptive or destructive cyber attacks of significant consequence.

– Build and maintain viable cyber options and plan to use those options to control conflict escalation and to shape the conflict environment at all stages.

– Build and maintain robust international alliances and partnerships to deter shared threats and increase international security and stability.

In June 2016, a likely cyber attack on Indian government and commercial organizations by Chinese military’s western headquarters was carried out[16]. An alert was issued to the Indian Armed forces that a Chinese Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group called Suckfly, based in Chengdu region, is targeting Indian organizations, with the defence establishments as is its prime targets. Suckfly is involved in carrying out cyber espionage activities by sending out a malware called Nidiran.

One thing is certain that cyber attacks in all its forms and variations are going to increase exponentially in both the military as well as the civil arena. This interim period of development of strategic cyber weapons accords an opportunity to nation like India to put in place its cyber offense & defense policies and enhance its cyber capabilities to meet eventualities in future.

It is understood that India has started thinking of setting up its own cyber-military industrial complex, and a proposal for automated cyber-defence was submitted in early 2016[17] for a productized platform to be developed jointly by public and private bodies. The proposal is supposedly based upon that of the US DoD Cyber Strategy. It caters to the sharing of cyber-attack indicators across the cyberspace domain in India.

The future cyber warrior in military domain may not confirm to rugged and tough image of soldier of today. He/she may be a person with mediocre health but with a cyber aptitude and capability that could collectively outshine India’s enemies.

[1] https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/11/san-francisco-rail-system-hacker-hacked/

[2] http://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2016/11/29/worlds-biggest-mirai-botnet-is-being-rented-out-for-ddos-attacks/#6040253c3046

[3] Ottis, R., & Lorents, P. (2010). Cyberspace: Definition and Implications. Tallinn: Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, CCD CoE. https://ccdcoe.org/multimedia/cyberspace-definition-and-implications.html

[4] Porche, I. R. I., Sollinger, J. M., & McKay, S. (2011). A Cyberworm that Knows no Boundaries. Santa Monica: RAND National Defense Research Institute. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP342.pdf

[5] JP 1-02 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington: US DoD https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf).

[6] JP 3-13 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. Washington: US DoD https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_13.pdf

[7] Bernier, M., & Treurniet, J. (2010). Understanding Cyber Operations in a Canadian Strategic context: More than C4ISR, more than CNO (Conference on Cyber Conflict Proceedings 2010). Tallinn: CCD COE. https://ccdcoe.org/publications/2010proceedings/Benier%20-%20Understanding%20Cyber%20Operations%20in%20a%20Canadian%20Strategic%20Context%20More%20than%20C4ISR,%20More%20than%20CNO.pdf

[8] https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2014/10/offensive-cyber/

[9] Cyberspace Operations, JP 3-12 (R)http://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_12r.pdf

[10] Clarke, R. A., & Knake, R. (2010). Cyber war: the next threat to national security and what todo about it. New York: Ecco.

[11] US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report on the Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation,2009.

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-030.pdf

[12] http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf

[13] https://chinadailymail.com/2013/02/23/mandiant-executive-summary-exposing-one-of-chinas-cyber-espionage-units/

[14] http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/documents/DOD-Strategy-for-Operating-in-Cyberspace.pdf

[15] http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf

[16] http://www.indiandefensenews.in/2016/06/defence-forces-on-alert-after-chinese.html

[17] http://www.huffingtonpost.in/pukhraj-singh/cyber-the-war-india-never-fought-but-lost/

Cyber warfare, Defence Technology, Emerging Technologies, Hybrid warfare, Indian Navy, Matters Naval, Naval warfare, Security, Sensors, Strategy, Swarms, Uncategorized

Hybrid warfare-The Naval Dimension

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(Published IndraStra Global 01 Jan 2017, http://www.indrastra.com/2017/01/FEATURED-Hybrid-Warfare-Naval-Dimension-003-01-2017-0002.html)

 It is so damn complex. If you ever think you have the solution to this, you’re wrong, and you’re dangerous. You have to keep listening and thinking and being critical and self-critical.

Colonel H.R. McMaster, 2006

In his monograph, Strategic Implications of Hybrid War: A Theory of Victory[1],Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Lasica posits that hybrid force actors attempt to combine internal tactical success and information effects regarding enemy mistakes through the deliberate exploitation of the cognitive and moral domains. In this manner, he describes hybrid warfare simultaneously as a strategy and a tactic because of the blending of conventional, unconventional, criminal, cyber and terrorist means & methods. A hybrid force is thus able to compress the levels of war and thereby accelerate tempo at both the strategic and tactical levels in a method faster than a more conventional actor is able to do. In this theoretical model, the hybrid actor will always gain a perceived strategic advantage over the conventional actor regardless of tactical results. David Sadowski and Jeff Becker, in their article “Beyond the “Hybrid Threat: Asserting the Essential Unity of Warfare,[2]” assert, that the idea of simply seeing hybrid warfare as a combination of threat categories or capabilities fails to appreciate the complexity of the hybrid approach to warfare. Rather, they argue that the essential aspect of hybrid warfare is the underlying unity of cognitive and material approaches in generating effects. Such a unity of cognitive and material domains allows for flexibility in a strategic context in which social “rules” can be redefined in an iterative process to the hybrid’s advantage in terms of legality and military norms.

Majors Mculloh and  Johnson in their monograph ‘Hybrid warfare’[3] have said that hybrid war may be best summarized as a form of warfare in which one of the combatants bases its optimized force structure on the combination of all available resources—both conventional and unconventional—in a unique cultural context to produce specific, synergistic effects against a conventionally-based opponent.

 Don’t ever forget what you’re built to do. We are built to solve military problems with violence.

– A Former Brigade Commander in Op Iraqi Freedom

Therefore, it will not be wrong to say that Hybrid warfare in naval context is a violent conflict utilizing a complex and adaptive organization of regular and irregular forces, means, and behavior across a predominantly maritime domain among others to achieve a synergistic effect, which seeks to exhaust a superior military force.

Alternatively, put simply, it is naval irregular warfare plus cyber war and any other component that emerges in future. CIA has succinctly brought out the contrasting dimensions of Modern versus Irregular warfare in the following table:

Contrasting Dimensions of War[4]
Modern Irregular
Organized Informal
Advanced technology At-hand technology
Logistics-dependent Logistics-independent
National direction Local direction
Coherent doctrine Ad hoc doctrine
Decisive battle Raids and skirmishes
Soldier Warrior
Allies Accomplices
Segregation Integration

Littoral areas and cities in vicinity of the coast could be important sites of future conflict, and both have characteristics that make them more complex than the high seas, and hinterland. Adversaries will increasingly exploit these complex environments to degrade technological advantages of regular forces. Given the close proximity of many cities to the coast as well as abundance of unmanned coastal areas, maritime hybrid is a distinct possibility requiring active involvement of the Navy and the Coast guard. In case of a maritime hybrid war the normal components of the Navy would continue to play an important part in the littorals and in open seas for interdiction of adversary’s irregular assets like floating armories and mercenary flotillas.

Maritime forces are often utilized primarily in support of ground operations, but it is seen that; in environments with a maritime component; maritime operations tend to have a noticeable comparative advantage over land-based operations in terms of mobility, freedom of maneuver, and the ability to impose a smaller or less visible footprint on land. The maritime forces could easily choke supplies through the sea route to reach adversary, protect own maritime trade and fishing in the area, provide logistic and fire support to forces on land from the sea, close escape routes and so on. One important point is that vital external maritime support can be conveniently obtained from friendly nations at sea for ISR, communications and fighting cyber war. The supporting ships could be operating as close as just 12 miles off the coast or hundreds of mile in open seas without violating any regulations.

Now it would be appropriate to look at a few of the salient features of 26 Nov 2008 Mumbai attack as relevant to subject at hand. The Mumbai attack has been analyzed in great depth by various agencies (for e.g. Rand’s ‘Characterizing and Exploring the Implications of Maritime Irregular Warfare’[5] and ‘The Lessons of Mumbai[6]’) and individuals, therefore an attempt is being made here to highlight the main findings of some of these studies. In addition to the meticulous planning, reconnaissance, likely pre-positioning of weapons & ammunition, the major innovation on the part of the terrorists was the real-time exploitation of the international media. Each of the terrorists carried a BlackBerry smart phone to monitor CNN and BBC Internet coverage of the attack in real time. They then immediately adjusted their tactics to increase the amount of media coverage that the attacks would receive. It is believed that the major efforts made by the terrorists to kill U.S. and British civilians were part of the plan to garner more international press coverage.

The case of the LeT attacks in Mumbai illustrates the advantages that could accrue to an adversary from a maritime approach to a target. A maritime approach allows operatives to avoid border crossings and airport security, it offers opportunities to hijack a local vessel so that attackers can blend in with the normal local coastal traffic, and offers terrorist teams extra time for pre-attack planning as well as extra time for rest just before the attack commences. Finally, a maritime insertion allows terrorists to select very precise landing sites and infiltration routes.

The case of the LeT attacks in Mumbai also illustrates the disadvantages that can accrue to a terrorist enemy from a maritime approach to a target. First, once a full blown, large-scale assault has started, it can be very difficult to extricate the operatives. Second, the transport of large explosives aboard fishing vessels and trawlers is risky; thus, maritime terrorist strikes might be limited to relying on small arms to do their damage. Third, some kind of reconnaissance cell would have to be sent to the target city well in advance of the attack, providing an opportunity for a skilled intelligence agency to mount surveillance on the reconnaissance cell and break up the plot before the assault team could embark. Moreover, a maritime approach does not allow the terrorist team to disperse until it lands ashore. Even if the operatives approach in two or three different small boats, the interception of just one of the boats could drastically reduce the team’s numbers and effectiveness.

The fact remains that despite low technological instrumentation, a non state/state sponsored actor coming from open sea, could carry out effective surveillance & reconnaissance regarding the characteristics of targets at land/sea that could be attacked in future. Maritime Hybrid War may graduate to pose bigger economic threat than a military one. Furthermore, these economic costs could be imposed with relatively minor investments from the adversary.

What is worrisome is that now the Hybrid threat can emerge from anywhere in the vast oceans; be it floating armories, mercenary flotillas, or innocuous vessels carrying legitimate cargo with an embedded cyber war-waging cell. The maritime hybrid threat has to be interdicted using Naval and marine assets preferably before it reaches the shores and synergizes with other elements into a full-scale hybrid war. Even though the Indian Government has strived to put in place a very robust MDA there are intelligence gaps, which remain among the various agencies involved which could lead to slipping in of threatening elements physically or otherwise.

“The categories of warfare are blurring and do not fit into neat, tidy boxes. We can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction — from the sophisticated to the simple — being employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare.”

Professor Colin Gray

Cyber War

A word about the maritime dimension of cyber war would be proper at this stage. In recent years, there has been considerable discussion of the phenomenon of cyber warfare, its methods, and its ramifications. In essence there are three objectives that can be achieved by cyber-offensive activities: espionage (infiltrating the target’s information storage systems and stealing information), denial of service attacks (preventing Internet usage), and sabotage (infiltrating systems reliant on Internet connections and causing functional damage via malevolent programs). The media largely focuses on the use of computer programs as weapons in the cyber domain, but an attack on Internet infrastructure especially the submarine optical fiber cables is no less an option for terrorists, and often more devastating and effective. In fact, thousands of miles of more than 200 international submarine cable systems carry an estimated 99% of all the world’s trans-oceanic internet and data traffic. Widespread disruption to undersea communications networks could sabotage in excess of $10 trillion in daily international financial transactions, as stated by Michael Sechrist in a 2012 paper ‘New Threats, Old Technology Vulnerabilities in Undersea Communications Cable Network Management Systems[7]’ published by the Harvard Kennedy School. It is pertinent to note that satellites carry just about 5% of global communication traffic.

Even partial damage has extensive consequences because of the resultant jamming of traffic on the limited remaining connection. It is true that the diplomatic and military effects of having Internet communication with world at-large cut off would not be significant, but the direct and indirect economic consequences could be extremely expensive to our economy, especially with the transfer of much data to online cloud services that are actually placed abroad.

What bigger Hybrid threat can be posed at sea than the cutting off the subsea internet cables at time, place, and depths of one’s choosing or cutting off undersea facilities like VLF communication nodes and hydrophones? Would it not be an example of extreme denial of service weapon? Incidentally, such capabilities do exist with some nations today.

Two other aspects of hybrid war, which merit immediate attention of the maritime forces, are onslaught of sensors and swarm warfare.

Sensors

One very important aspect of the Hybrid warfare is transparency in every field because f utilization of various types of sensors. This ubiquitous sensing revolution promises enhanced awareness of physical, social, and cyber environments by combining three technological trends: the proliferation of ever cheaper and more capable sensors into virtually every device and context; large data aggregation and ready access to it using vast cloud-based archives; and cross-spectral data fusion & sense-making algorithms running on increasingly powerful processors. All of these trends are accelerating, at exponential rates. For instance, as brought by Capt John Litherland, USN (ret), in his paper ‘Fighting in the Open: The Impact of Ubiquitous Sensors on the Future Maritime Battle space’[8]:

-The worldwide total number of sensors has increased tremendously and will pass the one trillion mark, or more than 100 sensors for every person on earth.

– Mass production of electronics has led to significant enhancements in Sensing capabilities. Every smart phone today has a complete inertial, electronic and satellite navigation system comprising just a minor component of its price. Incidentally, a smart phone today hosts of many  of the sensors such as, accelerometer, temperature, gravity, gyroscope, light, linear acceleration, magnetic field, orientation, pressure, proximity, relative humidity, rotation vector and temperature[9].

-The worldwide digital data generation rate now exceeds one ZB (1021 bytes) per year and global storage exceeds 10 ZB.

-The ability to fuse and make sense of unstructured data from disparate sensors and incommensurable formats is being addressed by use of advances in processing capability and data handling algorithms.

-The advent of sensors has however, made the battle space transparent. Today, the warfare has to adapt to this transparency and let go traditional concepts of concealment and camouflage. Stealth technologies are unable to cope up with concealing signatures of the multitude of sensors being used across various domains, be it in the air, on the surface or under water. Navies today can no longer spring a surprise on the adversary because it is not feasible to operate blind in a battlefield littered with multi-spectral sensors, dispersed spatially, and operating in broadband.

The Indian Navy (IN) has to prepare for this aspect of hybrid warfare. The Indian Navy could utilize some of the concepts out lined by Litherland in his paper quoted above[10] :

– Dispersal – IN forces must disperse over as much of the maritime battle space as possible.

– Deception – IN must strategize on targeting the adversary’s sensor complex across multiple spectra with noise, false targets, and cyber attacks.

– Range – IN must gainfully implement Net Work Centric warfare to bestow ‘crippling effects’ at large distances when dispersed.

– Speed – together with range, the speed at which kinetic and non-kinetic effects can be imposed on the adversary will also be a critical factor in Naval war.

Unless the Indian Navy starts preparing now to fight in the Age of Sensors, it risks becoming vulnerable in the event of a hybrid war.

Swarms

Seminal work has been done on Swarm warfare by Prof. John Arquilla  and David Ronfeldt in their various writings (Swarming and Future of Conflict[11], Countering and exploiting Swarms[12], etc.) the present section derives from their thought processes. Swarm warfare has become the dominant doctrinal concept of certain navies like the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, which has about fifty missile and torpedo boats, along with other light coastal craft, all of which train to employ ‘ESBA’ i.e. like a swarm of bees tactics. The IRGC Navy also has several bases on small islands in the Persian Gulf, from which they can “swarm by fire” with the Chinese missiles in their inventory. China’s PLA Navy regularly practices swarm tactics with its missile, torpedo, and gunboats.

For the Indian Navy, comprised as it is of a number of high-value vessels, swarms pose a considerable and rising threat. Swarm attacks are likely not only from small boats, but also from aircraft, submarines, and drones. At present, the author is unaware of any fitting response by the Indian Navy focused on the use of counter-swarms of drones, and robots. The Indian Navy should also consider responses; as suggested by Prof  Prof. John Arquilla[13];  by designing swarms of much smaller craft like large numbers of jet-ski-sized drones or autonomous weapons whose goal would be to seek out and destroy incoming swarms with rockets, or by ramming and self-detonating. Small and swift Weapons could pose a far superior swarming threat to hybrid adversaries. IN could also think of small undersea swarming systems which are already on the design board to meet demands of clearing minefields, engaging enemy submarines, and carrying out ISR missions. Similarly, small aerial swarm weapon systems could prove exceptionally useful in dealing with air defense of carrier strike groups.

Conclusion

So ‘ere’s to you fuzzy-wuzzy, at your ‘ome in the Soudan; You’re a pore benighted ‘eathen, but a first class fightin’ man. 

Rudyard Kipling

Starting with the fundamental definition of Hybrid war in maritime context as “Naval irregular warfare plus cyber war and any other component that emerges in future”, the implications of cyber, sensors, and swarm warfare have been discussed in this article. However, new types of hybrid threats would keep surfacing and the IN has to be ready for them when called upon to counter them.

Hybrid war, being inherently nebulous and dynamic in nature, calls for constantly adapting naval doctrines and technologies to meet the emerging maritime hybrid threats.

(Based upon a talk ‘Maritime and Air Dimensions of Hybrid War’ delivered by the author during ‘National Seminar: Hybrid Warfare’ on 02 Nov 2016 under aegis of Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi)

[1] https://www.scribd.com/document/40211290/Strategic-Implications-of-Hybrid-War-a-Theory-of-Victory

[2] smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/344-sadowski-etal.pdf

[3] http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA591803

[4]https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/96unclass/iregular.htm

[5] http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1127.html

[6] https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP249.pdf

[7] http://ecir.mit.edu/images/stories/sechrist-dp-2012-03-march-5-2012-final.pdf

[8] http://www.secnav.navy.mil/innovation/HTML_Pages/2015/07/FightingInTheOpen.htm

[9] https://www.quora.com/how-many-different-sensors-are-available-inside-a-smartphone

[10]http://www.secnav.navy.mil/innovation/HTML_Pages/2015/07/FightingInTheOpen.htm

[11] http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB311.html

[12]http://www.secnav.navy.mil/innovation/HTML_Pages/2015/04/CounteringAndExploitingSwarms.htm

[13] ibid

China, global reach, Indo-Pacific, Littorals, Matters Naval, Naval warfare, Security

Jade Necklace: Naval Dimension of Chinese Engagement with Coastal Nations Across the Oceans

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(Published IndraStra Global, 17 Dec 2017; for complete interactive experience visit http://www.indrastra.com/2016/12/FEATURED-Jade-Necklace-Naval-Dimension-of-Chinese-Engagement-with-Coastal-Nations-Across-the-Oceans-002-12-2016-0032.html )

“Be extremely subtle even to the point of formlessness. Be extremely mysterious even to the point of soundlessness. Thereby you can be the director of the opponent’s fate.”  

 Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Over a period, Chinese analysts have zeroed upon various countries/islands, which they consider inimical by being under the influence of the United States of America due to trade, military or common political goals. These include; countries/islands in Central Asian Region, Mongolia, India, and Diego Garcia in the outer periphery; Hawaii, Singapore, & Vietnam in the next closer circle; followed by Guam, Australia and New Zealand due to vicinity of second island chain; and Philippines (now tilting in favor of China), ROK & Japan within or around the first island chain. The aim of this article is to provide a naval perspective into the Chinese maritime engagements with nations having seacoasts.

Western Pacific Stand-Off Defenses-Carrier Killer DF-21 D and Guam Killer DF-26

In 2010, The US DoD acknowledged that the Dong-Feng 21D (DF-21D) Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile with a range of 1450 km had attained an initial operating capability. This missile can target a moving aircraft carrier from land-based mobile launchers and has maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MaRVs) with a terminal guidance system. It is understood that this missile is capable of destroying an aircraft carrier with a single hit. The emergence of DF-21D has led the US Navy to rework the ‘carrier support’ warfare approach with respect to China and recommence building of its ballistic missile defense destroyers.

In 2015, China displayed The Dong-Feng 26 (DF-26). It is an intermediate-range ballistic missile produced by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). The DF-26 has a range of 3,000–4,000 km, and is said to have nuclear, conventional, and anti-ship strike variants. It is capable of targeting  American military installations at Guam therefore, it has earned the tag of the “Guam Express” or “Guam Killer”. Guam provides the US a strategic base to target the Asian continent with B-52s, F-35s, and F-22s. It also provides basic operational turnaround facilities for carriers and submarines.

Security Concerns-East China Sea

“China’s long-term goal is to build a real ‘blue’ water navy with global reach” – Song Zhongping, Military Commentator

China has built a pier for warships near a military base site close to the disputed Senkaku Island [2] in the East China Sea. A new 70 to 80-meter long pier for warships has been constructed on one of the islands in the Nanji island chain. It lies close to Wenzhou and is nearer to China than the nearest base of Japan. It is understood that a Coast Guard base is being constructed at Wenzhou, which would lend effective support to vessels for monitoring the Senkaku islands.

Security Concerns-South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region

The naval strategy of countries with large coastlines and hostile maritime neighbors invariably factors in submarines and anti-submarine warfare. A modern submarine is a potent multi-role asset that can carry out ISR, special ops, offensive missions, sea denial, and SLOC protection among others. In case it carries strategic weapons, it acts as an important leg of the nuclear triad. Undersea warfare by deploying submarines and/or other unmanned underwater systems is considered crucial in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) environments. Considering the offensive capability a submarine bestows upon the nation operating it, there is some merit in also examining the likely basing /sale by China of conventional submarines and its associated high technology in the IOR.

South China Sea (SCS) – In early 2016, Satellite photographs had revealed that China had deployed two batteries of eight HQ-9 surface-to-air missile launchers as well as a radar system, on Woody Island.[3] HQ-9 is a new generation medium-to-long-range, active radar homing, track via missile SAM. Infrastructure for aircraft, runways, and missiles is visible on Subi reef, Fiery Cross reef, and Mischief reef as well. China has continued building a network of artificial islands and turning them into mini military bases.

Submarine Operations: It is understood that complete control of SCS is considered essential by China to provide its expanded submarine fleet unrestricted and unobserved access to the Pacific Ocean from their base in Yulin, Hainan. The underwater channels and straits in SCS facilitate clandestine movement of the submarines through the first and second island chains. It is also understood that China State Shipbuilding is likely to construct the “underwater great wall” a sonar surveillance system with ship and submarine sensors for effective monitoring of foreign vessels in the SCS.

Indian Ocean Region

Djibouti Naval Base – China’s support facility for PLA Navy at Djibouti about 8 km from the US military base is it’s most ambitious and first of its kind foray in having a military base outside of China. The facility would have ship and helicopter maintenance facilities, weapon stores, and support infrastructure for a small contingent of PLAN personnel [5]. This development is of prime importance for India in view of Djibouti’s vicinity to Gwadar as well as the fact that it has been placed under the Western Theatre Command [6] at Chengdu, which would have integral naval assets as well as assets from the PLA Rocket Force  (which controls strategic assets) of China.

Pakistan – In August this year, it was reported that Pakistan is likely to acquire eight attack submarines [8] from China. They are probably export versions of Type 039 and Type 039A/041 (with Air Independent Propulsion). Primary weapons for these submarines are the 533 mm Yu-4 torpedoes, it is also possible that they can fire the Yu-6 wire-guided torpedoes. The torpedo tubes are capable of firing the YJ-8 anti-ship cruise missile, AScM, with a range of 80 km. The submarine can carry a mix of torpedoes, missiles, and mines. The Type 041’s weapon package includes the YU-6 wire-guided torpedoes, mines, and the YJ-8 AScM. It could in the future field the supersonic YJ-18 missile.

Bangladesh –  First of the two Chinese submarines [9] was delivered to Bangladesh on 14 November 2016. The Type 035G diesel-electric submarines, carry torpedoes and mines and are capable of attacking enemy ships and submarines.

Thailand – The Royal Thai Navy is likely to finalize [10] the purchase of three Chinese submarines after dithering over it for some time.

Malaysia – The Royal Malaysian Navy, RMN is planning to buy up to ten littoral mission ships [11] (patrol craft) from China. It is also likely that Malaysia may consider Chinese submarines as a replacement for its HDW submarines in future. It is expanding the RMN Kota Kinabalu submarine base with workshops and air defense systems [12].

Berthing Facilities for PLA Navy in IOR

Myanmar– Construction of two deep-water ports at Kyaukphyu by a consortium headed by CITIC group of China [13] would provide China access to the Bay of Bengal and hence to the IOR. The government has earmarked 1708 hectares for the Kyaukphyu SEZ, with two deep-sea ports, industrial zone, and a housing project.

Sri Lanka – Sri Lanka is trying to breathe life into the Hambantota port and infrastructure project by handing over controlling interests to a Chinese consortium [14].

Maldives – There are indications that Maldives may let the China build a seaport at Gaadhoo Island [15 in the southern atoll. The location of the island is significant as it sits at the entrance to the one-and-a-half degree SLOC channel.

Pakistan – Gwadar port was inaugurated in November 2016 [16] with 250 containers carrying Chinese goods shipped on Chinese ships to the Middle East and African countries.

Tanzanian and Kenyan Ports – Bagamoyo port of Tanzania will be operated by China Merchant Holdings. Lamu port in Kenya is being developed by the China Communications Construction Company [17], and China Roads and Bridges Company is going to construct a modern port in Kisumu [18], Kenya (Lake Victoria).

Access to IOR of Chinese Mechanized Forces

Maj. Gen Bakshi, a strategic analyst has brought out the following two important facets of CPEC in his recent article [19].

The alignment of the CPEC corridor includes two major loops that come close to the Indian borders in Punjab and Rajasthan where major tank battles had been fought during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars. These loops in the CPEC grant a military bias to the otherwise proclaimed trade route.

The Chinese army in its thrust on rapid modernization has mechanized its formations to wheel/track based formations that make them very agile. It also allows them to bring their tremendous firepower to Indo-Pak borders through CPEC in the case of any conflict.

Needless to assert that the same firepower can be transshipped rapidly to Gulf, Europe and African coast if required.

Security Concerns-Elsewhere

“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” – Sun Tzu, The Art of War

The following table accessed from SIPRI highlights the types of weapon systems exported by China during 2014 and 2015.

TIV of arms exports from China (Weapon Systems)-2014-2015
Generated: 10 December 2016
Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in US$ m. at constant (1990) prices.
Figures may not add up due to the conventions of rounding.
A ‘0’ indicates that the value of deliveries is less than US$0.5m
For more information, see http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
2014 2015        Total           
Aircraft 215 409 624
Air defence systems 52 64 116
Armoured vehicles 302 384 686
Artillery 94 27 121
Engines 1 1
Missiles 197 206 403
Sensors 30 10 40
Ships 470 865 1335
Total 1360 1966 3326

The following table accessed from SIPRI provides arms export by China during 2014 and 2015.

TIV of arms exports from China to nations-2014-2015
Generated: 10 December 2016
Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in US$ m at constant (1990) prices.
Figures may not add up due to the conventions of rounding.
A ‘0’ indicates that the value of deliveries is less than US$ 0.5 m
For more information, see http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
   2014 2015                     Total
Algeria 68 254 322
Angola 1 1
Bangladesh 245 474 719
Bolivia 20 20
Cameroon 74 74
Djibouti 8 7 14
Egypt 1 1
Ethiopia 2 2
Ghana 13 13
Indonesia 39 33 72
Iran 9 9 19
Iraq 17 17
Jordan 1 1
Kenya 7 10 16
Myanmar 267 288 554
Nigeria 57 58 115
Pakistan 394 565 959
Peru 13 13
Saudi Arabia 8 8
Seychelles 10 10
South Sudan 12 12
Sudan 32 27 59
Syria 5 5
Tanzania 26 20 46
Thailand 8 8
Trinidad and Tobago 16 16
Venezuela 77 147 223
Zambia 8 8
Total 1360 1966 3326

-It is interesting to note from the above table that 24 countries out of the 28 countries to which China has exported Arms and Ammunition have a maritime border!

-Further, the only four land locked countries that receive arms and ammunition from China have contiguous boundaries with Coastal nations, which in turn are beneficiaries of Chinese arms export. (Bolivia-Peru; Ethiopia-Kenya & Djibouti; South Sudan-Kenya; Zambia-Tanzania)

-it can be seen that the list covers nations in Asia, Gulf, both coasts of Africa, and Latin America. This intern implies ease of berthing facilities for Chinese Naval vessels in ports of these nations.

Gateway to Europe 

“The cooperation at Piraeus port is not just an economic collaboration but has strategic characteristics. Greece, via the Piraeus port, can indeed become China’s gateway into Europe to the benefit of China and Greece,”  Pitsiorlas, Chairman of the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund privatization agency.

Greece – The ancient Greek port of Piraeus and one of the largest in Europe, located in the Mediterranean basin has been acquired by COSCO Shipping of China after purchasing 51 percent stake in the port [20]. COSCO Shipping is scheduled to construct a second container terminal for Chinese exports to Europe. The sale another Greek port Thessaloniki; which is being eyed by Chinese companies; is currently put on hold.

Turkey – In September 2015, Chinese state-owned shipping, and logistics company COSCO Pacific, along with China Merchants Holdings International and CIC Capital, had acquired a majority stake in one of the largest container terminals of Turkey, namely Kumport at Ambarli coast of Istanbul [21].

Thus, China has established a critical foothold in Europe by acquiring the Piraeus port as well as the Turkish container terminal in Kumport as part of its strategic One Belt One Road strategic initiative.

Chinese Foray into, Antarctica, and the Arctic (Bering Sea)  

“China’s rapid Antarctic…expansion reflects Beijing’s desire to become a maritime, and polar, great power” – Prof Anne-Marie Brady, Antarctic specialist

China is setting up its first Air Squadron [23] in Antarctica to support its ongoing scientific explorations. China is also a signatory to the Antarctic Treaty that bans the military activity in the region, but there are many dual capability missions, which can aid military research and operations in face of contingencies.

In September 2015, in a first of its kind mission five PLAN ships sailed in the Bering Sea off Alaska [24], interestingly, the PLAN ships were in the area during the visit of President Barack Obama to Alaska. With global warming likely to open the Northern Sea Route sooner than later, China is keen to utilize this opportunity as the route cuts down the distance and passage time to Europe. However, since Canada claims sovereignty over the said waterways, this could pose “the biggest direct challenge to Canadian sovereignty in the Northwest Passage,” [25] according to Professor Rob Huebert, of University of Calgary.

Global Outlook of PLAN – Chinese Navy has undertaken modernization of its Naval fleet to meet its Global Navy focus as part of its geopolitical strategy. As analyzed in a Wikistrat report, “Chinese Navy ships have transited the Red Sea and Suez Canal, the Mediterranean, the Cape of Good Hope, the Bosporus, the Panama Canal, the Strait of Magellan, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, and have made port calls all along both the east and west coasts of Africa, Bulgaria, Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Australia. Chinese warships have sailed into American territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands off the coast of Alaska in the Bering Sea” [26].

Conclusion 

“So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong, and strike at what is weak.” -Sun Tzu, The Art of War

A global strategic net has been cast by China by creating fundamental structures for sea trade and commerce. China has been carrying out calibrated development of its maritime capability in mercantile shipping, fishing, undersea exploration & exploitation, and the Navy. It is likely that by 2025 the world would have to come to terms with the global maritime status of China as also the blue water capability of PLAN. The attendant security issues and concerns would follow.

It is no longer a string of pearls in the IOR, it is a studded ‘Jade Necklace Across the Oceans’ that stares at the developed world in defiance today.

Options: 

  • Preclude confrontation given the precarious global economic situation and nuclear deterrence
  • Preclude submission given the dispositions of the existing and emerging power centers
  • Preclude peaceful co-existence, as it is utopian under the existing circumstances where national interests have prevented even an internationally acceptable definition of terrorism
  • Could include rapid building up of a robust coalition to create two distinct power centers, provided the United States is able to synergize its economic might with those of the like-minded nations and tamper the perception that it is a global hegemon.

Time to act is now!

 “Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win”  – Sun Tzu, The Art of War

  Publication Details:

Kulshrestha, Sanatan. “FEATURED | Jade Necklace: Naval Dimension of Chinese Engagement with Coastal Nations Across the Oceans” IndraStra Global 02, no. 12 (2016) 0032 | http://www.indrastra.com/2016/12/FEATURED-Jade-Necklace-Naval-Dimension-of-Chinese-Engagement-with-Coastal-Nations-Across-the-Oceans-002-12-2016-0032.html | ISSN 2381-3652|

Endnotes:

[1]http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China’s%20Expanding%20Ability%20to%20Conduct%20Conventional%20Missile%20Strikes%20on%20Guam.pdf

[2] https://sputniknews.com/world/201608201044449726-china-pier-for-warships/  

[3] http://www.news.com.au/world/ongoing-escalations-in-the-south-and-east-china-seas-has-some-analysts-daring-to-wonder-who-would-win-a-war/news-story/20da5034d2b32ff31d35242cee26b656  

[4] http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1993754/south-china-sea-air-strips-main-role-defend-hainan   

[5] http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-builds-first-overseas-military-outpost-1471622690   

[6] http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-02/02/content_7160686.htm   

[7]http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/01/content_6839967.htm   

[8] http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pak-to-acquire-8-attack-submarines-from-china-for-4-billion-report-1452729   

[9]http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/Bangladesh-buys-two-submarines-from-China/articleshow/55415904.cms   

[10] http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/is-thailand-now-serious-about-submarines-from-china/

[11] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-china-defence-idUSKCN12S0WA   

[12]http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/malaysia-eyes-submarine-base-expansion-near-south-china-sea/

[13] http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-moves-to-revive-its-sway-in-myanmar-1456697644   

[14] http://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/10/28/sold-sri-lankas-hambantota-port-and-the-worlds-emptiest-airport-go-to-the-chinese/#1d473d1716d8    

[15]http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/China-may-build-port-in-southern-Maldives/articleshow/51771171.cms 

[16]http://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2016/nov/13/pakistans-strategic-gwadar-port-opens-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-1538139.html   

[17] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36458946  

[18]http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Chinese-firm-to-build-Sh14bn-Kisumu-port/1248928-3130106-4m9purz/index.html

   [19] http://www.newindianexpress.com/magazine/voices/2016/nov/26/india-needs-to-seek-alliance-partners-who-are-prepared-to-contain-the-chinese-aggression-1542281–1.html   

[20] https://www.rt.com/business/355523-cosco-stake-greek-port/   

[21]http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/infocenter/news/Pages/280915-cosco-pacific-buys-turkish-kumport.aspx   

[22] https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/considering-chinas-strategic-interests-in-antarctica/   

[23] http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/china-to-establish-antarctic-air-squadron-in-2016/

[24] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-military-idUSKCN0R22DN20150902   

[25] http://time.com/4302882/china-arctic-shipping-northwest-passage/

[26]http://wikistrat.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Wikistrat-The-Chinese-Navy.pdf
 

Indian Navy, Indian Ocean, Indigenization, Naval warfare, OPVs, Security

Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs)- Navy’s Armed Patrol

 

(Published SP’s Naval Forces, Dec 2016-Jan 2017. Vol 11 No. 6 )

“It is not surprising that some OPVs are multirole and heavily armed, lighter scantling and faster, whereas others are larger, heavier, therefore slower, and equipped for the purposes of survey [and] pollution control. I think in the past some of the vessels which now come under the banner of OPV would have previously been called something else, such as corvette, light frigate or fishery protection vessel, but due to the current fad they fall under the generic term of OPV.”

Mike Stamford, Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB)

A modern navy operates various types of warships to meet its diverse roles from simple coastal patrols to power projection and war fighting. While the navy has aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, submarines, and missile boats for its offensive missions it also has different class of ships for patrol, presence and support roles.

The grant of 200 nm EEZ and the extension from three nm to 12 nm of the maritime boundary/territorial waters of a nation brought to fore requirement of naval ships that could fulfill the roles of extended coastal security as well as provide security cover to the EEZ. The other coastal roles that are needed for the naval craft include, pollution control, SAR, law enforcement, firefighting, towing etc. Larger naval ships cannot maneuver in the restricted and shallow coastal waters and would largely remain underutilized if deployed for EEZ patrols. This had given rise to the birth of Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) Class of ships. The OPVs however, are being built to sizes and roles specific to a nation; they may range in size from a large attack craft to nearly a frigate size ship. They are proving economic for smaller nations because of their low cost and flexible roles. They are mainly being used for, extended coastal patrols, EEZ protection, maritime presence, law enforcement at sea, HADR, and if needed, for Arctic or Antarctic ice patrols. The primary roles for the combat OPVs are AAW and ASuW. They can be classified as combat OPVs and specific capability OPVs. The combat OPVs are faster and could be equipped with ASW, AAW, or ASuW weapon systems. These OPVs can take part in combat and meet the survivability standards of naval warships.

Weapons on Combat OPVs

While some nations have equipped their OPVs with Exocet and similar missiles, the majority of the combat role OPVs carry three types of weapons namely; a large/medium caliber main gun, a small caliber auxiliary gun, and a machine gun. The machine gun is also carried by the onboard helicopter.

–Main Gun.  A warship’s main gun can be a large caliber gun or a medium caliber gun. Many navies prefer medium caliber guns like the Oto Melara 76 mm, for their OPVs. The main gun’s maximum effective range is substantially higher than the auxiliary and the machine gun’s maximum effective ranges. Firing from long range is particularly important in conventional warfare, but not necessarily when fighting with terrorists. In littoral areas, there could be many merchant vessels, which could make it almost impossible to classify a ship at long distances. The only way to classify an unknown vessel from a long distance is with a helicopter. Therefore, even though the maximum effective range of the main gun ranges from 7000 meters to 10000 meters, the OPV would not be able to fire its main gun until the enemy boat is classified as hostile. The probability of hit is about 80% at 500 m.

– Auxiliary Gun. The auxiliary gun for the OPV is a small caliber gun for example a 30 mm CIWS naval gun. The auxiliary gun’s presence is important especially when the OPV is not able use its main gun for some reason. If the hit probability of the auxiliary gun is high, it can be a game changer.

– Machine Guns. A machinegun, normally a 12.7 mm, is operated by OPV personnel, and it has a relatively short effective range when compared to the ranges of the main and the auxiliary guns. Its main purpose is to warn other ships and to protect its own ship from small targets. The machine guns are very useful in crowded areas, since it is very difficult to classify a small boat from a long distance. It is also impossible to use missiles or long-range guns at shorter distances. Further, rules of engagement may not allow firing at hostile craft unless it approaches within a certain threatening range. In this case, the OPV can use its machine guns both for warning the approaching craft and for protecting itself. The probability of hit at 500 m is about 50%; it increases as the distance to target decreases.

–Onboard Helicopter and its weapon. The high-speed capability of the helicopter makes it one of the most valuable assets of an OPV. It can perform search, detection, and reconnaissance operations in relatively short amounts of time, and with high accuracy. Technological advances also allow the helicopters to use cameras that help them to classify the targets. When the helicopter detects an unknown vessel, it moves towards that target for classification at its maximum speed, which ranges from 50 knots to 180 knots. The friendly craft have AIS devices, which allow classification of almost all of the vessels in the area. However, there are could be some vessels that cannot be classified via AIS these could be identified by the helicopter. The classification distance may depend on weather conditions, capability of the camera, or the training of the operators. A 12.7 mm machine gun is normally used on the helicopter.

Combat OPVs

Larger combat OPVs, for example the UAE Baynunah class OPVs are combatants to meet the requirements of combat patrols in Strait of Hormuz. The Baynunah class are fitted with weapon systems including the MBDA Exocet MM40 Block 3 surface-to-surface missile (SSM) and the Raytheon Evolved SeaSparrow Missile (ESSM) RIM-162 surface-to-air missile (SAM). They also have an Oto Melara 76 mm gun and two 27 mm cannons. They also carry an organic helicopter, mine-avoidance sonar system, MASS decoy system, 3-D radar and a full communications suite. These OPVs meet the AAW and ASuW requirements of the UAE for protection of its assets and merchant shipping in the region. With a displacement of ~ 640 tons, they can achieve speeds of up to 32 kt. The first of these OPVs was built in France by Constructions Mécaniques de Normandie, while the rest are being built in the UAE by Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB).

BVT of UK (now BAE Systems Maritime – Naval Ships) has built combat OPVs, for Oman that, have a length of 98.5 m with a displacement of 2500 tons. They carry Exocet anti-ship missile and Mica vertical-launch close-area air-defense systems.

Dutch shipbuilder Schelde Naval Shipbuilding (DSNS) has built four OPVs for the Royal Netherlands Navy under Project Patrouilleschepen. These ships are 108 m long, displace 3750 tons and have a speed of up to 21.5 kt. They are to meet the requirement for patrol, surveillance and interdiction operations in the Netherlands EEZ. They carry a helicopter, a single 76 mm gun, a 20-30 mm gun and two machine guns.

Navantia of Spain has already constructed four Buque de Acción Maritima patrol ships for the Spanish Navy. These are built to a modular design for protection of maritime resources; maritime interdiction; port security; and counter-terrorism patrolling. These OPVs carry a helicopter and are armed with a single Oto Melara 76 mm gun and two 20 mm cannon, and fitted with the ‘Sistema de COMbate de los Buques de la Armada’ SCOMBA combat management system (CMS). Two more of the same OPVs are under construction.

Special Purpose OPVs

The specific capability OPVs are built to commercial standards and are equipped with lesser armament. They are rigged for specific role that they are designed for and may not be able to take part in battle at sea since they are bulkier and slower than the combat OPV. An area of developing role for OPVs are endurance and presence missions in the Arctic and Antarctic regions, which would necessitate changes in its design to meet operating conditions in broken ice. With the likely hood of opening up of Northwest Passage, it is expected that maritime trade from China and Japan would use this route for carting goods to Europe. Rolls Royce has been designing OPV type ships for meeting the Arctic/ Antarctic conditions. The Danish Arctic patrol ship, the Knud Rasmussen class is an example of such ships.

Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard had contracted BVT for building three presence OPVs for protection of oil and gas reserves, fishery protection, and for anti-drug operations however, the contract was cancelled and the OPVs were delivered to Brazil.

ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) of Germany has developed a series of 1,000-2,000 ton OPVs. These are: a 67 m fast OPV; an 81 m Guardian-class OPV displacing 1,800 tons; an 85 m, 1,900-ton Sentinel-class multimission OPV; and a larger 99 m version of the Sentinel OPV displacing 2,100 tons. They are built to commercial standards, the vessels are equipped with a helicopter and boat capability, have modest speed, sensors and weapons equipment.

BAE systems provides 90 m OPVs to Brazil, Thailand and UK.

India

As detailed in the website of IN, in its constabulary role, the IN is employed to enforce law of the land or to implement a regime established by an international mandate. The protection and promotion of India’s maritime security is one of the IN’s prime responsibilities. This encompasses a constabulary role, where it relates to threats that involve use of force at sea. The tasks that the IN has to undertake in the constabulary role ranges from Low Intensity Maritime Operations (LIMO) to maintaining good order at sea. It also includes coastal security, as part of India’s overall maritime security. With the establishment of the ICG in February 1978, law enforcement aspects of the constabulary role within the Maritime Zones of India (MZI) have been transferred to the ICG. Security in major harbors and ports are the purview of the port authorities, aided by customs and immigration agencies. Constabulary tasks beyond the MZI are vested with the Indian Navy. After the terrorist attacks on Mumbai on 26 November 2008, the overall responsibility for coastal security has been mandated to the Indian Navy, in close coordination with the ICG, State marine police and other central/state government and port authorities.

The Indian Coast Guard, ICG has been tasked to protect India’s maritime interests and enforce maritime law, with jurisdiction over the territorial waters of India, including its contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone. The ICG also operates Offshore Patrol Vessels. ICG deploys  Samar class Advanced Offshore Patrol Vessels having 2005 tons displacement, Vishwast class Offshore Patrol Vessels (1800 tons displacement) and Vikram class Offshore Patrol Vessels (displacement 1220 tons) . However, the number of OPVs appears insufficient to meet the requirement of patrolling and providing security to more than 7000 km of coastline and Island territories of Andaman-Nicobar and Lakshadweep.

The Indian Navy had started inducting the Offshore Patrol Vessels in the late eighties, but the numbers inducted appear to be far less than that required to effectively safeguard the maritime assets, sea lines of communications and tackle sea pirates.

Goa Shipyard Limited in India has been building a series of 105 m-long, 2,215 ton OPVs for the Indian Navy. They are fitted with a 76 mm naval gun and two 30 mm cannons, and are capable of operating a single Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) Dhruv helicopter.

The Pipavav NOPV class are naval offshore patrol vessels being built by Pipavav Defence and Offshore Engineering Company Limited. In June 2016, it was reported that the shipyard, which has been acquired by Reliance Defence, is now accelerating work on the delayed order where the first ship was supposed to be delivered in early 2015. As per the revised schedule, the first ship will now be delivered in early 2017 and all ships will be ready for induction by the end of 2017. The ships are being constructed in two batches of two and three ships with a shorter delivery schedule for the second batch.

Significantly, the IN OPVs can also be modified to accommodate Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit, (TEU) payloads, hence they can be considered as low cost warships with bigger roles.

Conclusion

OPVs have carved out a place for themselves mainly due to enhancement of territorial waters and the declaration of EEZ. The smaller nations too have equipped themselves with OPVs because of their versatility and low costs. The cost of the OPVs depend upon the combat systems and sensors required by a country to be put on board. To keep the costs low the combat system should therefore, be mission specific and limited to the low-intensity capabilities. While OPVs are not equipped for full-fledged, combat they should be able to accomplish the constabulary tasks they are assigned to do. The OPV arena is set to expand with the likely hood of the opening of the North West Passage to Europe.

Blockchain

Military Applications of Blockchain Technology

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(Published 23 Nov 2016, CLAWS)

“Blockchain protocols are a new class of protocols that are extremely resilient to attack ‒ they gain that resiliency by virtue of being decentralized,”

Professor Emin Gun Sirer, Cornell University

Blockchain technology is fundamentally a mutually trustable storage facility for information of a transaction between multiple users. It is a decentralized and secure way to record, share, store, and redistribute information. There is no central authority controlling the Blockchain, it is run, monitored, and owned by everyone. Anyone can download it free and run it or develop it for new applications/types of transactions, just like an open source code. It enables verification of the transactions at any time without impinging upon privacy of the involved parties. Blockchain technology has the capability to become a disruptive technology during the current decade itself.

“A Blockchain is a magic computer that anyone can upload programs to and leave the programs to self-execute, where the current and all previous states of every pro­gram are always publicly visible, and which carries a very strong crypto-economically secured guarantee that programs running on the chain will continue to execute in exactly the way that the Blockchain protocol specifies.”

 Vitalik Buterin of Ethereum

Two main pillars of Blockchain technology are the ‘distributed consensus’ and ‘anonymity’[i]. It has applications in both the financial and the non-financial fields. In the non-financial sector major companies like IBM, Amazon, Samsung etc. are exploring innovative ways in which to use the Blockchain technology. The near term possibilities include putting ‘proof of existence’ of health data, legal papers, registry certificates (birth, marriage, death), digital trail of assets etc in the Blockchain.

IBM and Samsung have developed a system called ADEPT[ii] (Autonomous Decentralized Peer To Peer Telemetry) that uses design concepts of Bitcoin to construct a distributed network of Internet of Things. The ADEPT utilises three protocols-BitTorrent (file sharing), Ethereum (Smart Contracts) and TeleHash (Peer-To-Peer Messaging).

In the financial sectors, big banks find Blockchain to be a secure and reliable technology and are looking into a host of applications. R3, a financial technology firm is creating a framework for financial applications[iii] using Blockchain technology for a consortium of 15 leading banks. R3’s Corda distributed ledger platform was used by the banks to design and use self-executing transaction agreements. Two prototypes were created using distributed ledger technology for smart contracts. The consortium included Barclays, BBVA, BNP Paribas, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Danske Bank, ING Bank, Intesa Sanpaolo, Natixis, Nordea, Scotiabank, UBS, UniCredit, US Bank and Wells Fargo.

Military Applications

The NATO Communications and Information Agency is currently evaluating for proposals in areas of application of Blockchain technology to military logistics, procurement and finance, Internet of Things, and other applications of interest to military. The proposals have been submitted as part of the 2016 Innovation Challenge[iv] aimed at accelerating transformational, state-of-the-art technology solutions in support of NATO C4ISR and cyber capability requirements.

US DoD had raised a critical need for a secure messaging and transaction platform accessible via web browser or standalone native application. DARPA has therefore sought proposals vide SBIR 20162[v] to “ Create a secure messaging and transaction platform that separates the message creation, from the transfer (transport) and reception of the message using a decentralized messaging backbone to allow anyone anywhere the ability to send a secure message or conduct other transactions across multiple channels traceable in a decentralized ledger.”

“Whenever weapons are employed … it tends to be a place where data integrity, in general, is incredibly important,” …“So nuclear command and control, satellite command and control, information integrity is very important.”[vi]

Timothy Booher,  Blockchain program manager, DARPA

Critical Weapon Systems. DARPA has awarded a $1.8 mn contract[vii] to Galois for their Blockchain application Guardtime Keyless Signature Infrastructure KSI, to Verify Integrity Monitoring System for its potential to build a form of unhackable code for an enhanced security in critical weapon systems. KSI can detect advanced persistent threats (APTs) which work to remain hidden in networks. Galois works in the area of formal verification, which is a technique that provides mathematical assurances that a system works only as intended in all cases.

Conclusion

Blockchain is a promising technology. However, as is the case with all new technologies, following is relevant:

-users would have to get  used to the fact that under Blockchain technologies electronic transactions are safe, secure and complete.

-since it is in its nascent stage, scaling up presents issues which need to be resolved.

-legal frame work has to be modeled to include Blockchain technology.

-Migration of systems from existing centralized databases and systems could be tedious and expensive.

[i] http://scet.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/BlockchainPaper.pdf

[ii] http://www.coindesk.com/ibm-reveals-proof-concept-blockchain-powered-internet-things/

[iii] http://www.bankingtech.com/551002/r3-blockchain-consortium-gets-smart-on-trade-finance/

[iv] https://www.ncia.nato.int/NewsRoom/Pages/160425_Innovation.aspx

[v] http://www.acq.osd.mil/osbp/sbir/solicitations/sbir20162/index.shtml

[vi] https://cointelegraph.com/news/us-pentagon-may-use-blockchain-tech-for-nuclear-warhead-defense

[vii]https://guardtime.com/blog/galois-and-guardtime-federal-awarded-1-8m-darpa-contract-to-formally-verify-blockchain-based-inte

 

Cyber warfare, Unmanned

Cyber Warfare – a Perspective

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(Published  15 Oct 2016, CLAWS)

The US Defense Science Board report of 2013 states that “in a perfect world, DOD operational systems would be able to tell a commander when and if they were compromised, whether the system is still usable in full or degraded mode, identify alternatives to aid the commander in completing the mission, and finally provide the ability to restore the system to a known, trusted state. Today’s technology does not allow that level of fidelity and understanding of systems.” The report brings out that, systems such as automated intrusion detection, automated patch management, status data from each network, and regular network audits are currently unavailable. A cyber attack against national critical infrastructure could therefore have a cascading effect upon economy, society, and government in ways difficult to understand, model or predict.

In cyber warfare, it has been claimed that opponents can distract, disrupt, and demoralize a nation by skilful use of cyber tools, timing, surprise, and an adversary’s specific vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are not restricted to military targets; the ability to attack civilian targets such, as public utilities or financial sector can be far more dangerous and subsequently more effective, at discouraging and deterring potential adversaries because of its immediate social and political effects. Theoretically, at least adversary may not need kinetic weapons to render a nation incapable of defending itself. On the other hand, it has not been feasible to assess the real cyber warfare capabilities of the nations because these have never been used in large scale war-fighting resulting in serious damage or led to a full scale war between nations.

It is reasonable to presume that current tools of war would continue to be utilized for achieving military objectives simply because cyber attack in current form exists as a onetime gambit, since cyber weapons are transient and last only until the breaches are plugged. There is no doubt that delay and denial can be achieved to a large extent but whether that would lead to a victory on ground is a fact yet to be seen.

It has been brought out as per a Mandiant Consulting report that the mean time an intruder remained in the victim’s system undetected was 205 days in 2014 and 146 days in 2015. This highlights the use of cyber warfare to remain undetected in a system to prepare for a strike by infiltration, location of weak spots and leave cyber weapons for a preemptive strike to destroy networks and information systems.

Pure military planning and countermeasures would not be able to play a critical role in cyber security because of the civilian nature of cyberspace and the predominantly non-military nature of the nebulous attacker. Much of the cyber expertise and resources required to defend information infrastructure are located outside of the military establishments. Creating a credible cyber capability is less about technology than finding the right people and skill sets, which can be difficult for militaries.

Realm of Cyber Attacks. Some examples that highlight the distinct types of cyber attacks as relevant to national security are in order now. These are cited to highlight the extent of cyber reach from the dedicated attacks on strategic assets to tactical military operations to criminal activities like ransom.

One is the well-known Stuxnet strike, which required tremendous amount of resources, brainpower, and planning time. It falls under the one time gambit with major nations already on guard against similar strikes on their critical strategic facilities.

In 2009, Conficker worm infected civil and defense establishments of many nations, for example, the UK DOD reported large-scale infection of its major computer systems including ships, submarines, and establishments of Royal Navy. The French Naval computer network ‘Intramar’ was infected, the network had to be quarantined, and air operations suspended. The German Army also reported infection of over a hundred of its computers. Conficker sought out flaws in Windows OS software and propagated by forming a botnet, it was very difficult to weed it out because it used a combination of many advanced malware techniques. It became the largest known computer worm infection by afflicting millions of computers in over 190 countries.

There was a cyber attack in Dec 2015 against energy distribution companies in Ukraine, which led to massive power outages and affected a huge civilian population. This achieved high visibility while using an old Trojan BlackEnergy and other malware to shut down critical systems and wiping out data.

In February 2016, the Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in Los Angeles, California was the victim of a cyber attack that encrypted its electronic data rendering its systems unusable for over a week. The hospital was forced to operate with no access to its computer systems and even had to move some patients to other hospitals. Staff relied on fax machines and telephones to keep hospital operations moving. The hospital regained access to its data only after paying a fee of 40 bitcoin (approximately USD 17,000) to the attackers. In March 2016, Methodist Hospital in Henderson, Kentucky, experienced a similar attack and declared a “state of emergency” being unable to access patient files. Methodist Hospital was able to restore their system from data backups and did not pay the attackers. Since 2014, the CryptoLocker ransom ware alone has allowed cyber criminals to collect over $100 million.

While illustrating the wide ambit under which the cyber attacks take place and the enormous cyber space that requires protection the above examples also highlight the inevitable ease of threat to civilian space. The cyber war if unleashed in entirety could encompass strategic, tactical, financial, social, and psychological space among others. It would thus be waged beyond a traditional military war on the borders.

Autonomous systems. An area of immediate concern for the military is Autonomous systems, for a system to be autonomous, it must have the capability to independently compose and select among different courses of action to accomplish goals based on its knowledge and understanding of the environment.

Autonomous decision-making resides in software replete with branching logic and tables of variables and parameters, which together, model the mission to be accomplished, the environment in which it must be executed, and the conditions that are relevant. The more complex the mission and the more diverse the environment, the more extensive and complex is the software. The autonomous systems also have organic sensors, a considerable amount of stored information, and optional communication for some supervisory functions, along with a capability to receive and implement over-the-air updates. These systems present an ideal target for the adversary. Thus more the capabilities, more the software and hence greater the vulnerability. To weed out the intruder in complex software and eradicate vulnerabilities which may or may not have been introduced by the attacker would require validation and verification, which may not be humanly possible in the time available.

It is evident that the amount of data and the speeds at which processing is required in case of cyber defense is not feasible for human beings to carry it out. Conventional algorithms also cannot tackle dynamically changing data during a cyber attack. As it appears today, effective cyber defense would only be provided by real time flexible Artificial Intelligence systems with learning capability. This in simple terms requires using Artificial Intelligence systems at practically every stage of military operations.

Conclusion. As of penning this article, a code of Mirai malware was released by a hacker, which has resulted in the largest ever DDos attack across countries. Mirai malware is used to create botnets that infect Internet of Things devices connected to the internet. It is said that about 1.0 to 1.5 million devices have been infected so far with numbers rising every second.

Nations have to think differently if cyber attacks are to be defended effectively. During an international conference on Electronic Warfare in Kuala Lumpur recently, the delegates were surprised to note that Indian Government had been following a policy of segregating internet-connected computers from those that carried important information. Much of the software being developed for cyber defense is being sent over the web from India albeit under IPR of different nations. Time is ripe for India to harness and synergies both cyber attack and cyber   defense capabilities.