30 Mar 2026 Published Taaza Khabar News,
“Iran holds a lot of cards with the Strait of Hormuz.” — Justin Wolfers,
The geographical configuration of the Persian Gulf is characterised by narrow passages and strategically significant islands. The nature of conflict in this region has evolved from conventional naval engagements to a multifaceted scenario involving advanced technologies and subterranean infrastructures. Key islands, such as Kharg, Qeshm, Abu Musa, the Tunbs, and Larak, are strategically important to Iran. These islands facilitate Iran’s control over a major energy corridor and complicate adversarial attempts to dominate the Strait of Hormuz.
Kharg Island. Kharg Island is particularly vital to Iran’s economy, situated in the northern Persian Gulf, it serves as the primary hub for exporting nearly 90% of Iran’s oil. Despite its modest size, the island possesses deep waters capable of accommodating large vessels and has the capacity to load approximately 7 million barrels of oil daily. Located 34 miles northwest of Bushehr, Kharg Island is endowed with natural freshwater resources, a rarity in the Gulf region, which has supported sustained human habitation and activity. The availability of freshwater distinguishes Kharg Island from other arid Gulf islands, enabling a substantial population and workforce to reside there, thereby supporting a significant military presence and complex industrial operations that smaller islands cannot sustain. Presently, it houses 55 oil storage tanks with a combined capacity exceeding 34 million barrels.
Iran regards Kharg as a vital strategic asset, characterised by robust and multilayered defences. The 112th Zolfaghar Surface Combat Brigade of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) collaborates with the regular army to enhance these defences. This year, Iran augmented these fortifications to thwart potential ground assaults, reports indicate the presence of numerous anti-personnel and anti-tank mines along the coastline, particularly in areas susceptible to amphibious landings. The defence strategy for Kharg emphasises subterranean fortifications, and so Iranian forces have constructed an extensive underground network to ensure the continuous flow of oil and safeguard weaponry during aerial attacks. This network includes fortified shelters for fast-attack boats and missile batteries that can be swiftly deployed for combat and subsequently retreat into the island’s interior for protection.
The island hosts 112th Zolfaghar brigade which specialises in Fast-attack craft for asymmetric harassment. The Coastal Batteries have Nasr-1 and Kowsar missile systems which provide short-range anti-ship defence (up to 25 km). It has early warning and tracking Ghadir Radar systems with a range of 1100 km. Its Air Defences include S-300 and mobile batteries to counter cruise missiles and strike aircraft, and it has underground storage bunkers for protection of munitions and mines from air strikes.
In March 2026, United States airstrikes targeted military installations on the Kharg island, focusing specifically on sites storing sea mines and missiles intended to obstruct the Strait. These strikes deliberately avoided oil export regions to maintain economic stability and avert a global energy crisis. From the perspective of an aggressor, seizing control of Kharg Island offers “coercive leverage” without necessitating an invasion of the mainland. By capturing the island, a foreign power could exert control over Iran’s oil revenues, effectively placing the regime on a “ration card” system. This strategy presupposes that controlling a critical location can influence Tehran’s actions without a comprehensive mainland campaign. However, the military risks are substantial, U.S. experts assert that Iran’s defences, including minefields and missile batteries, would render any assault “extremely bloody.” The White House acknowledges that capturing Kharg would damage Iran’s economy but would not prevent the IRGC from continuing operations from other Gulf bases.
Qeshm Island. Although Kharg serves as an economic hub, Qeshm Island is pivotal to Iran’s naval strategy. As the largest island in the Persian Gulf, it commands the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. Its geographical features, including salt caves, mangrove forests, and rugged terrain, conceal “underground missile cities.” Qeshm functions as a “cork” in the Strait, from its southern shores, Iranian forces can monitor and potentially intercept all maritime traffic entering or exiting the Gulf. The island’s proximity to the mainland, a mere 22 km from Bandar Abbas, facilitates a continuous supply of resources and reinforcements, complicating efforts to isolate it through a naval blockade.
Qeshm Island serves as an “Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier” and missile hub, its considerable size provides strategic depth. Unlike smaller islands, it cannot be easily neutralised through aerial bombardment, it possesses the capacity for essential survival infrastructure, such as desalination plants and power generation facilities, which are vital for sustained resistance.
The “missile cities” located in Qeshm represent extensive subterranean networks designed to endure aerial assaults. These facilities house various armaments, including the following:
-Mobile coastal launchers capable of deploying Ghader (200–300 km range) and Abu Mahdi (exceeding 1,000 km range) cruise missiles.
-Concealed fast-attack craft (FAC) positions, where tunnels facilitate the rapid ingress and egress of IRGCN speedboats into shipping lanes, thereby evading detection by drones and satellites.
-Command and control (C2) nodes, which are fortified centres utilising data from drones and radars to provide comprehensive maritime situational awareness. The strategic objective of these “missile cities” is to exert control over or obstruct the Strait of Hormuz. This capability was demonstrated in recently when Iran halted maritime traffic following threats to attack any vessel attempting passage.
The March 2026 escalation underscored Qeshm’s military significance when U.S. airstrikes targeted a desalination plant on March 7, 2026, disrupting the water supply to 30 adjacent villages. This action was presumably intended to exert pressure on the IRGC by impacting the island’s logistical support for its military personnel and civilian population. In response, the IRGC swiftly retaliated against U.S. forces stationed in Bahrain, asserting that the assault on Qeshm originated from a proximate Gulf state. For adversaries, Qeshm constitutes a critical target, as its capture is perceived as essential to dismantling Iran’s dominion over the Persian Gulf, however, with a population of 148,000 and an intricate underground infrastructure, an invasion poses significant challenges. The island is frequently referred to as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” due to its formidable defences.
The Nazeat Islands. Abu Musa and the Tunbs serve as Iran’s primary maritime defence line, their strategic location near the narrowest segment of the Strait of Hormuz enhances their significance. Although the United Arab Emirates (UAE) lays claim to these islands, Iran has maintained control since November 30, 1971. The contention over these islands predates the establishment of the UAE. In 1971, as British forces withdrew, the Shah of Iran commanded the navy to seize the islands to prevent their transfer to the nascent UAE.
Since 1971, Iran has augmented its military presence on the islands and has not consented to international arbitration. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) characterises this as an “illegal occupation,” which constitutes a core issue for the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) foreign policy.
The Nazeat islands are vital for Iran’s maritime control, large oil tankers navigate between Abu Musa and the Tunbs, rendering these islands significant for monitoring and controlling maritime traffic. The islands are equipped with:
– Advanced Sensor Arrays: These include radar and other sensors for efficient ship tracking.
– Electronic Warfare (EW) Suites: These facilities can disrupt GPS signals, impacting over 1,000 commercial ships since February 2026.
– Missile and Drone Launch Pads: There are robust silos for missiles and pads for drones however, Recent satellite imagery indicates that U.S. strikes have inflicted “substantial damage” on the military facilities on the Nazeat islands. On Greater Tunb, 14 structures, including the main airfield hangar and fuel depots, sustained heavy damage or were destroyed. These strikes aimed to weaken the facilities supporting underground bunkers that store missiles and mines threatening the Strait.
From the perspective of an aggressor or GCC coalition, seizing the Nazeat islands is perceived to alter the situation with Tehran. By deploying coalition forces on these islands, they could safeguard shipping rather than threaten it, however, Tehran has cautioned that any attack from UAE territory on these islands would result in “direct and devastating strikes” on Ras Al Khaimah.
Larak Island. is situated at the narrowest point of the Strait of Hormuz, conferring a strategic advantage. It is equipped with bunkers and attack craft for close combat in the Strait. Iranian gunboats frequently approach commercial vessels to inspect documents or redirect them. Vessels must navigate close to Larak’s coast, enabling Iran to control traffic. Securing control of Larak is essential to dismantling Iran’s hold on traffic, but the island is heavily fortified and poses a significant risk for any invading force.
Sirri and Lavan. Sirri and Lavan Islands serve as critical backup centres for oil and naval operations. During the Iran–Iraq War, when Kharg Island was subjected to intense attacks by Iraq, Iran strategically relocated much of its shipping activity to these islands. Presently, they play a crucial role in supporting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy’s (IRGCN) “mosquito fleet” strategy. In 1988, during Operation Praying Mantis, the United States Navy targeted and destroyed the Sirri oil platform because of its use by Iranian forces to attack tankers. In the current conflict, these islands remain significant targets, utilised for deploying fast boats and serving as observation points to monitor the southern Gulf.
Iranian Naval Doctrine
The core of Iran’s naval capabilities lies with the IRGCN, established in 1985 to conduct asymmetric warfare in coastal regions. This strategy, known as the “mosquito fleet” approach, employs numerous small, swift, and agile vessels to challenge more formidable adversaries. The mosquito fleet comprises of over 1,500 small attack boats, many of which weigh less than 10 metric tons. These vessels are designed for high-speed, asymmetric “swarm” warfare and can achieve speeds ranging from 50 to 110 knots, complicating the response efforts of larger warships.
Attack Boat Classifications
Heydar-110: Heydar-110is a carbon-fibre catamaran capable of reaching speeds of 110 knots, equipped with two Nasr-1 missiles. It was introduced in March 2026, and represents a significant advancement, as it can attain speeds of 204 km/h, rendering it difficult to intercept with conventional ship systems. In the constrained waters of the Gulf, these boats can effectively conceal themselves, execute rapid attacks, and evade before the adversary can respond.
Zulfiqar-class: Designed for escort and missile strike operations, achieving speeds of 50-70 knots. They are armed with short-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship missiles (AShMs).
Sina-class: Fast attack craft serving as a guided-missile platform.
Seraj-1: A high-speed interceptor capable of exceeding 60 knots, armed with rockets and heavy machine guns.
Swarm Tactics and Economic Asymmetry. The Iranian mosquito fleet is integral to Iran’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy. Swarm tactics compel U.S. destroyers to engage their radar and fire-control systems against multiple targets, creating an “economic asymmetry” in which a defender may expend a $2 million interceptor to neutralise an inexpensive speedboat or drone.
Iran’s missile arsenals and coastal defence necessitate that other navies maintain a considerable distance offshore or remain under constant radar surveillance. This Iranian system integrates short, medium, and long-range missiles into a single AI-supported network. Short- and medium-range system missiles, such as the Nasr and Kowsar, can strike targets up to 25 km away, making them ideal for targeting tankers within the narrow lanes of the strait. The Ghader missile, with a range of 200–300 km, enables coastal batteries to target naval groups near the Gulf’s entrance.
The Abu Mahdi Long-Range Cruise Missile has been produced in significant quantities since 2023, and plays a crucial role in Iran’s defence strategy. This missile can strike targets over 1,000 km away, including U.S. military bases in Qatar and Bahrain. The missile employs artificial intelligence to maintain a low-altitude flight path over the sea, thereby reducing its radar cross section. It is equipped with both active and passive target acquisition modes, enabling it to locate and track targets even in complex electronic warfare environments. Additionally, it has the capability to evade counterattacks. Since January 2025, mobile launchers have been distributed to IRGC units. These launchers are designed for mobility, making them difficult to target.
Subsurface Warfare
In shallow waters off the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s small submarines have demonstrated superior operational effectiveness compared to larger nuclear submarines. The Ghadir, 29-m long submarine can operate in waters as shallow as 30 m. They are utilised for the clandestine deployment of mines and torpedoes, such as the Valfajr and Hoot. The larger, Fateh-class 600-ton submarines are equipped with advanced sensors for operations in deeper waters. The first of this class, IRIS Fateh, was reportedly lost during the current conflict; however, additional units are also said to be operational.
The mine threat- Experts assert that Iran’s mine-laying capabilities pose a significant threat. Since the onset of the conflict, Iran has deployed at least a dozen Maham 3 and Maham 7 mines in the Strait. The process of mine clearance is protracted and can disrupt maritime traffic for weeks, as minesweepers are vulnerable to attacks from nearby artillery.
Unmanned and Autonomous Systems
The current conflict has marked a pivotal moment in naval warfare, characterised by the large-scale deployment of kamikaze unmanned surface vessels (USVs) in the Persian Gulf for the first time.
Iranian USV and Drone Capabilities. The IRGCN has deployed various types of drone boats, including the Seadog, Ghaton, and Saegheh, by leveraging technology from Ukraine and Houthi rebels. These vessels, which carry 100–500 kg of explosives, are guided by GPS, radar, or artificial intelligence. These include
-Seadog / Ghaton is a surface USV with a speed of 50+ knots and a range of ~200 km. It has GPS, Radar and AI guidance.
-Saegheh has different Surface USV variants with speeds of 40+ knots, range of ~150 km and has GPS cum Remote guidance.
-Azhdar UUV is a Torpedo Drone of speeds up to 18-25 knots and a range of 600+ km. It utilises a Lithium-battery, its silent operation renders it difficult to detect amidst the ambient noise of the Gulf waters, enabling it to approach critical targets and detonate in proximity.
-Shahid Bagheri is a 40,000-ton ship converted into a Drone Carrier with speed up to 20+ knots and a range of 22,000 nm, that can launch drone swarms and missiles. It enables Iran to project power far from its coastline without the need for refuelling. However, it has been severely damaged in the current conflict.
The Electronic Battlefield and the Sino-Iranian Nexus
The conflict of 2026 is characterised by an increased reliance on artificial intelligence and a robust technological partnership between Iran and China. China assists Iran through the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), facilitating the transition of Iran’s military from reliance on American GPS to the Chinese BeiDou-3 system.
-Decoy and Deception: Chinese enterprises have developed systems capable of emitting deceptive signals that mimic oil tanker movements, thereby obfuscating genuine military operations and misleading adversarial surveillance with erroneous data.
-Digital Twins: CETC employs sophisticated simulations of maritime movements and environmental conditions, allowing Iranian commanders to test and modify attack strategies in real-time using surveillance data.
-Unified Command: AI systems integrate satellite, drone, and radar data into a cohesive framework, minimising confusion and enhancing the precision of missile guidance.
U.S. AI-Enabled Targeting (Maven Smart System). The U.S. military employs the Maven Smart System for targeting operations in Iran. However, the use of AI in targeting has elicited ethical and operational concerns, particularly following a strike on a school in Minab that resulted in 168 casualties.
Electronic Warfare and Signal Spoofing. Since February 2026, the Persian Gulf has experienced sophisticated electronic interference impacting both military and commercial vessels.
-U.S. jammers utilise AI-driven beams to incapacitate Iranian radar, creating “invisible electronic bubbles” that prevent missiles from targeting coalition aircraft.
-Tehran has disrupted GPS signals utilised by critical U.S. platforms, such as RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft and MQ-9 Reaper drones, necessitating the use of backup systems.
Geopolitical Toll Booth: As of late March 2026, the Strait of Hormuz is subject to a new phase of Iranian control, as opposed to a complete blockade. Through the Hormuz “Toll Booth” and Selective Passage, Iran has implemented a “selective transit model,” permitting “non-hostile” vessels to traverse the Strait contingent upon coordination with Iranian authorities.
Vessels are required to navigate a designated route north of Larak Island within Iranian territorial waters. Vessels associated with the United States, Israel, or other identified “aggressors” are prohibited from safe passage. Certain vessels, such as Chinese state-owned tankers, have remitted payments to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for secure transit through the Strait.
-Oman and Alternative Routing. Oman has emerged as a pivotal player in regional trade, with ports such as Salalah and Sohar accommodating cargo that cannot access the Gulf. A ” green corridor ” was established in March 2026 to facilitate the overland movement of goods from Omani ports to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, thereby circumventing naval threat zones.
Assessment of Relevance and Future Outlook: The strategic configuration of the Persian Gulf Islands in 2026 signifies a substantial shift in maritime control. Dominant naval power no longer prevails in narrow regions where geographical advantages favour coastal actors employing advanced technology and robust infrastructure.
The ongoing U.S.-Israeli air campaign resulted in the destruction of numerous significant Iranian naval assets, including the IRIS Makran and over 154 smaller vessels. However, the threat persists, the “mosquito fleet” and mobile missile batteries remain formidable, leveraging the strategic depth of islands such as Qeshm and the fortified bunkers of the Nazeat islands.
Strategic Conclusions
Geography as a Weapon: The narrow and shallow Strait of Hormuz constitutes Iran’s primary strategic advantage. Efforts to secure it through conventional means alone could result in significant casualties and disrupt the global economy.
The AI Escalation: The integration of artificial intelligence in targeting and navigation has accelerated military decision-making but has also introduced risks of errors and civilian casualties.
Economic Coercion vs. Total War: The U.S. strategy of targeting Kharg Island aims to exert financial pressure on the regime rather than achieving a military defeat. The success of this strategy hinges on precise execution and preventing Iran from reaching a state of complete economic desperation.
The New Maritime Order: The “selective transit” model suggests that the future of the Strait may involve managed pathways and geopolitical alignment, rather than unrestricted navigation.
Islands located in the Persian Gulf have become integral components of a strategic initiative aimed at exerting influence over the global economy. As the current conflict persists, these islands are anticipated to gain even greater significance. They will serve as a testing ground for contemporary naval strategies and the resilience of the international energy supply chain.
Current Status
The United States has deployed two carrier strike groups to the region in conjunction with Israeli forces, indicating the potential for operations beyond mere air strikes. The U.S. Marine Corps is concentrating on littoral combat, with a possible focus on specific islands. The operation, termed “Multi-Island Gambit,” seeks to undermine Iran’s defences by seizing strategic islands.
Key Targets: Abu Musa and the Tunbs- Historically, naval assaults have failed without ground support. Consequently, the coalition intends to neutralize Iran’s air defences to prevent reinforcements. The coalition probably plans to employ advanced tactics, including the use of helicopters and stealth aircraft, to circumvent mines and secure islands.
Strategic Target: Kharg Island- Kharg is heavily fortified with mines, necessitating a substantial force, including airborne troops and coastal security, for its capture. The coalition probably intends to leverage artificial intelligence to rapidly identify and target Iranian defences, with support from Israeli and GCC air forces.
Qeshm and Larak Islands: Qeshm Island, has a population of 150,000. Consequently, a full-scale occupation of the island is improbable. Instead, Qeshm and Larak Islands may be subjected to targeted assaults on strategic locations and sustained aerial bombardment. Larak Island’s proximity to a narrow strait renders it precarious to deploy troops without securing complete control over the adjacent waters. Therefore, coalition forces may employ unmanned surface and underwater vehicles to blockade Larak and monitor its missile installations.
Crystal Gazing. the coalition will implement a phased “Island Hopping” strategy adapted for contemporary warfare. Initially, they would swiftly seize Abu Musa and Greater Tunb using marine littoral teams to establish a secure corridor for minesweeping operations. Subsequently, they would execute a robust offensive on Kharg Island, deploying the 82nd Airborne Division to gain control of the oil terminals before they incur damage. This strategy leverages the geographical positioning of the islands as a defensive mechanism, by dominating these islands, the coalition establishes a defensive perimeter in the Gulf, thereby preventing the IRGC from executing attacks utilising unmanned vehicles, mines, and small boats that currently obstruct the Strait.
Still hoping for peace to prevail at the earliest!!
“It is not enough to win a war; it is more important to organize the peace.” — Aristotle
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