Published Indian Defence Review Jul-Sep 2025 Vol 40(3)
[On the morning of May 10, while commending the response of the Indian armed forces, Prime Minister Modi extended his congratulations to General Dwivedi and Air Chief Marshal Singh. Subsequently, he addressed Admiral Tripathi, remarking, “Humne aapke mooh se niwala cheen liya, aapko mauka phir milega” (“I have snatched the morsel out of your mouth, but your turn will come”). This comment followed the directive for the Indian Navy to refrain from launching a BrahMos missile attack on the Karachi port.]
The partnership between India and the US has been shaped by regional conflicts, security issues, and diplomatic talks. US-India relations were especially complex during the Indo-Pakistani conflicts, where nuclear weapons limited military actions and influenced diplomacy. During these tensions, the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) and Simla Agreement (1972) were meant to promote peace between India and Pakistan. However, these agreements have been strained by recent conflicts such Pahalgam terrorist attack and thereafter India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty and Pakistan’s threats to end the Simla Agreement.
Operation Sindoor marked a change for India, moving from a strategy of restraint to taking pre-emptive military action against cross-border terrorism. The US now supports India’s ability to handle its security issues independently, but it still engages with Pakistan, complicating crisis management in South Asia. This dual approach has increased tensions, as seen during the Pahalgam terror attack that occurred during high profile US diplomatic visits. As India takes a stronger military stance, US-India relations are changing. Operation Sindoor shows India’s commitment to fighting terrorism and reflects a shift towards security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region.
This article examines the impact of Operation Sindoor, including the subsequent events such as the US-Pakistan strategic relationship, Iran’s nuclear capability being reduced, Pakistan’s betrayal of Iran, Pakistan and CENTCOM, designation of BLA & Majeed Brigade as Foreign Terrorist Organisations, and the Trump Tariffs on India, which are going to shape the maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.
The Pahalgam attack increased the tensions in the region. India responded with a coordinated military campaign targeting terror and military sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). This operation aimed to punish and show India’s determination to fight terrorism across borders. Operation Sindoor had a broader effect on India’s military strategy and regional security. It assessed joint operations among the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, highlighting the need for integrated capabilities to address threats. It also stressed the importance of being ready for quick and precise military action. After Operation Sindoor, India continues to strengthen military partnerships through joint exercises and strategic talks with friendly nations such as the USA, showing a growing alignment of military interests. Coordinated efforts are important for improving cooperation and readiness against the growing challenges in the area, such as the actions of Pakistan and China.
The plans and strategies of the Indian Navy have changed significantly since the 1971 War, creating a robust system for sea operations. Recent actions, such as Operation Sindoor, show how the Navy can control the sea and affect land operations without directly taking part in the action. Using naval forces is now a key part of India’s military plan, focusing on controlling the sea to protect important routes and deter enemies, especially the Pakistani Navy. During Operation Sindoor, the Indian Navy used thirty-six ships, including its Carrier Battle Group, in the Northern Arabian Sea. This move kept the Pakistani Navy in their ports, demonstrating the Navy’s power to deter and discourage. General Anil Chauhan, the Chief of Defence Staff, highlighted the Navy’s strong impact on enemy plans, helping India’s military goals. Vice Admiral A.N. Pramod pointed out the Navy’s quick response, mobilising its carrier group within 96 hours of a terrorist attack in Kashmir and conducting exercises in the Arabian Sea. These actions showed the Navy’s ability to control situations and prepare for strikes, if needed.
The Navy’s role is crucial in India’s defence strategy, combining sea and land operations. To improve its effectiveness, the Indian Navy is part of reforms to create Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs) and Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs). These aim to combine the might of Army, Navy, and Air Force based on location and function, improving readiness and response in different areas. The focus on working together shows a move towards a complete military approach, including space and cyberspace abilities, with traditional naval power.
Operation SINDOOR changed India’s approach to fighting terrorism. It combines military actions with political solutions. This operation aimed to hit terrorist bases without starting a full war, demonstrating the careful use of military force. Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that it was both a response to threats and a warning to others in the area. The focus on intelligence and surveillance is strong, showing that the military is ready for more action if needed.
The results of Operation SINDOOR affect India’s relationship with the United States and other allies. There are growing investments and partnerships in key areas such as defence technology leading to increased military cooperation. Joint projects with U.S. in modern technologies and strong supply chains show a desire to strengthen strategic ties, helping both countries to keep the region stable and secure.
After Operation Sindoor, India saw better military cooperation with its global partners. This operation highlighted the value of joint exercises, which improved skills and strengthened partnerships. A recent event was a naval exercise with the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) from 1 June to 3 June 2025 in the Indian Ocean. This exercise focused on advanced counterpiracy operations and aligned with India’s increased counterterrorism efforts under Operation Sindoor. In EUNAVFOR frigates from Italy and Spain joined Indian naval forces, demonstrating a commitment to working together in the Indo-Pacific region.
The United States Navy has also worked closely with Indian forces in various exercises. The Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise, held every year, aims to improve cooperation among navies. The recent CARAT exercise with Sri Lanka included the US Navy and Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force, supporting regional maritime security and rule-based order in the Indian Ocean. This joint effort is also important for the US’s goals in the region and strengthens the abilities of the allied forces.
Another important exercise is the Exercise Tiger Triumph, a joint operation from 1 April to 11 April 2025. It focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, with joint training between the United States and Indian forces, including a large amphibious landing drill in Kakinada. The harbour phase included discussions on key technologies and improved understanding between the two militaries. One of the most important naval exercises is the annual Malabar exercise between navies of India, U.S., Australia and Japan. It is a key component of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. As both the U.S. and India face new security challenges, these joint exercises not only improve tactical skills, but also show their commitment to regional stability and shared values in the Indo-Pacific region.
The United States is becoming a stabilising force in South Asia, especially with the rising tensions between India and Pakistan. Both countries are aligning their strategic interests with the U.S. Historically, the U.S. has improved its relationship with India while maintaining some cooperation with Pakistan to manage crises and counter China’s influence in the region. This affects South Asia’s military and economic dynamics.
Implications for U.S.-India Relations
The ongoing conflict presents a challenge for the U.S., which wants to counter China’s influence in Pakistan while supporting India’s security needs. The crisis has shown weaknesses in China’s military hardware support for Pakistan, raising questions regarding its reliability as an ally. As U.S.–India military collaborations grow, there may be changes in alliances in South Asia, affecting U.S.–China relations in the Indo-Pacific.
India has a stronger role in the Indo-Pacific region, it needs to manage complex alliances and rivalries. The U.S. sees India as a key partner against China, promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific. However, India’s independence could be affected by U.S. expectations of regional security, which may not always match India’s interests. Despite these challenges, Operation Sindoor has opened opportunities for deeper U.S.–India collaboration, especially in defence and technology. This operation has shown India’s confidence, making it a partner capable of influencing global norms, especially in emerging technologies, such as AI, quantum computing, and biotechnology. Joint projects in these areas could boost India’s defence capabilities and its role in global tech governance. India’s goal of technological self-reliance aligns with the U.S.’s interest in using its engineering talent and digital infrastructure. The potential for joint research centres and exporting India’s Digital Public Infrastructure to the Global South highlights the benefits of this partnership.
As both nations explore these opportunities, they must manage the risk of miscalculation and conflict. As both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, regional stability is crucial. Ensuring U.S.-India relations do not worsen tensions with Pakistan or lead to military escalation will require careful diplomatic and strategic planning. The post-operation Sindoor period is a turning point for U.S.-India relations, where shared interests in defence and technology can lead to a stronger partnership.
Operation Sindoor and its Aftermath- Impact on China
A series of recent geopolitical shifts; including India’s “Operation Sindoor,” the subsequent strengthening of U.S.-Pakistan relations, the bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites, and the perceived betrayal of Iran by Pakistan; have implications for China’s strategic interests in the region. This part of the article examines these events and offers insights and conjectures regarding their impact on China.
In the aftermath of Op Sindoor, rather than relying on its traditional “all-weather friend’ China, Pakistan appears to have pivoted towards the United States. Key indicators of this shift include Financial and Military Support, Pakistan secured a critical IMF disbursement and continued U.S. support for its F-16 fleet, indicating a renewed financial and military partnership with Washington. The repeated visits of General Asim Munir, Pakistan’s de facto leader, to the U.S. and his meetings with President Trump signify a deepening bond and a significant shift in diplomatic priorities. Reports suggest that the U.S. is positioning military assets in Pakistan, potentially at bases such as Nur Khan. These bases could serve as forward-operating locations for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions as well as for potential pre-emptive strikes. This U.S.–Pakistan rapprochement represents a substantial setback for China’s regional strategy. Pakistan has long been a cornerstone of China’s approach to counter India. The renewed U.S.–Pakistan partnership diminishes China’s influence over Islamabad and complicates Beijing’s ability to use Pakistan as a reliable lever.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) faces potential threats due to increased U.S. influence and military presence in Pakistan. Such developments could introduce instability or necessitate enhanced transparency and oversight, thereby potentially compromising the project’s security and financial sustainability. The US-Pakistan partnership, particularly if it involves “rare mineral concessions” and oil development in Baluchistan, would directly undermine China’s strategic interests and cast doubt on the future viability of CPEC and Gwadar Port. Gwadar, a critical element of the CPEC, serves as a strategic access point for China to the Arabian Sea, should the United States gain influence over Gwadar or if alternative economic development initiatives were prioritised, the strategic and financial justification for China’s investment in the port would be significantly compromised. The fact that Gwadar remains underutilised, is prompting Pakistan to explore new partnerships for its commercialisation, which the United States could potentially exploit.
The context of Chinese investments in Iran outlines a 25-year strategic partnership between China and Iran, which has been hindered by lagging investments and weak implementation. Following a US-backed attack, China’s position has become increasingly precarious, rendering its support for Iran ineffective and its standard condemnatory statements lacking in credibility. Consequently, casting a shadow on the strategic partnership and diminishing China’s influence in the Middle East.
The presence of U.S. military forces in Pakistan, in conjunction with the Quad alliance may be perceived by China as part of a broader strategy of geopolitical encirclement. This situation could exert pressure on China’s western flank, creating new security challenges.
The U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear sites, perceived to have been conducted using surveillance and reconnaissance also from Pakistani airspace, represents a significant breach of trust by Pakistan towards Iran and has implications for regional power dynamics. Although Pakistan and Iran have historically maintained a complex relationship, recent efforts have been made to improve bilateral ties, including setting ambitious trade targets. This may be perceived as a major betrayal by Tehran. This event would be particularly detrimental given that Iran relied on Pakistan’s support. This would not only sour Iran-Pakistan relations, but also severely damage Pakistan’s standing in the broader Muslim world, where it has often sought to position itself as a leader and could result in a loss of economic and diplomatic support from other Islamic nations. This unanticipated betrayal of a Muslim country by Pakistan may have left China wondering about the true nature of its relationship with Pakistan.
China maintains a 25-year strategic partnership with Iran, encompassing significant oil purchases and military cooperation. The U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, particularly if facilitated by a Chinese ally, would constitute a major setback to this partnership. Although China has condemned U.S. strikes, its response is complicated by its relationship with Pakistan. Since China has cultivated relationships with both Iran and Pakistan, this development presents a serious strategic dilemma and may compel China to choose between its two partners or risk alienating them.
Iran is a crucial source of oil for China. Any instability or conflict in the Middle East, especially one that could disrupt the oil flow, poses a direct threat to China’s energy security. The U.S. bombing and subsequent regional tensions could lead to sanctions and disruptions that would be costly for Beijing.
The diminishing relevance of Chinese bases, particularly in Djibouti, has emerged as a direct consequence of these developments. Djibouti serves as a pivotal node in China’s Indian Ocean Region (IOR) strategy intended to safeguard shipping lanes and project power. However, the strategic significance of the Djibouti base is likely to reduce with the potential collapse of partnerships in Pakistan and Iran. If China’s overland route through Pakistan is compromised and its economic ventures in Iran falter, the Djibouti base would lose much of its purpose of securing a now-defunct supply chain. Increased competition is also likely, as the United States maintains a long-standing relationship with Djibouti, positioning the country as a battleground for US-China competition. Should China’s strategic foothold in the broader region weaken, the United States and its allies are likely to intensify efforts to marginalise China’s presence in Djibouti, rendering it a more costly and less effective asset for Beijing.
Pak and CENTCOM
Analysing Pakistan’s recent actions, particularly the attendance of Army Chief General Asim Munir at the retirement ceremony of the US CENTCOM Chief General Kurilla, requires examination of the dynamics of global power, regional rivalries, and internal pressures. Pakistan’s actions indicate to a deliberate departure from rigid, binary foreign policy. Historically, Pakistan has oscillated between aligning with a major superpower, such as the United States during the Cold War, and maintaining its relationship with its “all-weather friend,” China. The current strategy appears to be one of “multi-alignment,” wherein Pakistan seeks to cultivate relationships with multiple powers—the United States, China, Gulf states, and Central Asian nations—without becoming a satellite of any single entity. That said, the relationship with Beijing remains the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign and defence policy, especially since China is Pakistan’s largest arms supplier. However, by re-engaging with the US, Pakistan is aiming to create greater leverage and flexibility.
From the U.S. perspective, maintaining a cooperative relationship with Pakistan, a nation with a significant coastline on the Indian Ocean and close ties with China, holds strategic value. Pakistan’s decision to engage publicly and prominently with the U.S. CENTCOM is a calculated strategy aimed at achieving both strategic flexibility and economic stability. It is not a simple choice between the United States and China but rather an effort to navigate an increasingly multipolar world that necessitates alliances and partnerships on multiple fronts. By signalling its willingness to cooperate with the United States, Pakistan seeks to secure economic lifelines, gain leverage in its regional rivalry with India, and maintain its relevance in a global landscape dominated by the United States and China.
The designation of the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) and its alias, the Majeed Brigade, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the U.S. State Department represents a significant development in the region. This designation is perceived as advantageous for China and its investments in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Historically, the BLA has targeted Chinese nationals and the CPEC infrastructure, perceiving these projects as exploitative and a threat to Baloch sovereignty. By officially labelling the BLA as a terrorist organisation, the United States confers a degree of international legitimacy to Pakistan’s efforts to fight the group. A more secure environment in Baluchistan would be conducive to the completion and operation of CPEC projects, which are integral to the Belt and Road Initiative. The U.S. designation, as an official acknowledgment of the BLA’s terrorist nature, could be leveraged by Pakistan to substantiate its claims that India is supporting a terrorist organization, potentially presenting this as evidence of India’s “state-sponsored terrorism.” This designation by the U.S. constitutes a significant diplomatic gesture towards Pakistan, occurring at a time when the U.S. seeks to enhance its relationship with Islamabad. It represents a strategic advantage for Pakistan’s government and military establishment and may render Pakistan a more cooperative partner for the United States. Baluchistan, being a mineral-rich province, has attracted U.S. interest in its “critical minerals.” By contributing to the stabilisation of the region and curbing the BLA’s activities, the U.S. may be positioning itself for future commercial or security partnerships with Pakistan to access these resources. This designation could facilitate American companies’ investments in the region by reducing security risks. On the flip side, while the designation aids in securing CPEC projects, it also enables the U.S. to maintain its presence and exert influence in a region where China is expanding its footprint. By collaborating with Pakistan on security matters in Baluchistan, the U.S. can secure a strategic position and potentially counterbalance exclusive Chinese dominance. The U.S. designation of the BLA has several implications for the Gwadar-Chabahar dynamic: a more secure environment in Baluchistan directly benefits Gwadar and the entire CPEC infrastructure. This development is a substantial advantage for China and Pakistan, as it enhances the viability of their multi-billion-dollar investments. A stable and secure Gwadar port bolsters China’s economic and military presence in the Indian Ocean, which poses a concern for India and the U.S.
The BLA’s operational area encompasses the border regions between Iran and Pakistan. While India and Iran are partners in Chabahar, the U.S. designation of a terrorist group operating in the same general area could exert pressure on India. Any perceived association or inaction against the BLA by India or Iran could be exploited by Pakistan and China for diplomatic advantage.
The United States has historically granted waivers to India concerning its involvement with the Chabahar port, acknowledging its significance in delivering humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the U.S.’s designation as the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA), a group active in the same province as Chabahar, may serve as a mechanism for the U.S. to exert influence on both India and Iran. The U.S. might leverage regional security concerns to scrutinise activities at Chabahar, despite the port not being directly associated with BLA attacks. This situation could place India in a challenging position, as it must navigate its strategic interests in Iran while maintaining its relationship with the U.S. The U.S.’s stance on the BLA underscores its prioritisation of its relationship with Pakistan, particularly in counterterrorism efforts, and implicitly supports the security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This places the U.S. in a contradictory position, as it simultaneously seeks to counter China’s influence while taking actions that indirectly support a significant Chinese initiative. This underscores the U.S.’s multifaceted foreign policy objectives in the region, which are not always perfectly aligned.
Although the current situation poses a challenge, China may seek to capitalize on the transactional nature of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Should Pakistan perceive a lack of long-term strategic support from the United States, it may realign its focus towards China. Beijing is likely to monitor any indications of discord and be prepared to offer financial or military assistance.
China is likely to use these developments to its advantage in global propaganda efforts, depicting the United States as a destabilising force and a source of conflict in the Middle East. This strategy may garner support from nations in the Global South and reinforce its narrative of a multipolar world order.
Thus, it is seen that convergence of events after the Pahalgam terror attack by Pakistan, has potentially resulted in a decrease in China’s influence within the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), while consolidating India’s status as a regional power.
Trump Tariffs and Acquisitions by Indian Navy
The recent imposition of U.S. tariffs on Indian exports post Operation Sindoor (U.S.-Pakistan bonhomie) and the U.S. failure to cement a cease fire between Ukraine and Russia, has introduced a significant layer of complexity and potential cost escalation for India’s procurement of high-value military hardware from the United States. This issue is multifaceted, affecting not only the direct costs of the hardware but also the broader defence and strategic relationship between the two nations. This part of the article analyses the procurement of platforms such as the P-8I maritime patrol aircraft.
The basic problem arises from the imposition of high tariffs on Indian goods by the U.S. government. While tariffs might be a response to various trade-related issues or geopolitical considerations, their impact on defence procurement is a significant and unintended consequence. Modern military hardware, such as Boeing P-8I, is not manufactured in a unique location, it is a complex product of global supply chains. U.S. manufacturers, such as Boeing, often outsource a substantial number of components from various countries, including India, when the U.S. imposes tariffs on Indian components, it necessitates that the U.S. defence manufacturer pay a higher duty to import those parts. This increased cost is then transferred to the end customer, India, in the form of a higher price for the finished military hardware. It creates a “boomerang effect,” where tariffs intended to penalise India’s exports lead to a price hike for India’s own defence purchases.
P-8I serves as a prime example as India has a long-standing relationship with Boeing on this platform, and Indian companies are a part of its global supply chain. The imposition of new tariffs on these Indian components could lead to a significant price increase for any new P-8I order, such as the one for six additional aircrafts that was under consideration. Recent reports indicate that India is reassessing its plans to procure new U.S. weapons and aircraft, including a potential deal for additional P-8I jets. This pause is a direct response to the cost escalation caused by tariffs. While the Indian Ministry of Defence has officially denied reports of a complete halt, it is evident that “forward movement” on these deals has stalled as New Delhi seeks clarity on the tariff situation. The proposed deal for six additional P-8I aircraft, valued at a significant sum, has reportedly seen a substantial price increase, with some sources claiming a 50% increase. This kind of cost escalation renders the deal financially unviable and compels India to re-evaluate its options. Considering cost dynamics, it is logical to consider the renegotiation of existing or proposed contracts. This process is inherently time consuming and may result in delays in the delivery of essential military assets. India must advocate for clauses that either mitigate the impact of tariffs or hold U.S. manufacturers accountable for any cost increase. This situation may prompt India to exercise greater caution regarding future large-scale defence acquisitions from the U.S.
The unpredictability of U.S. trade policy and the potential for cost escalations due to tariffs should lead India to prioritise its domestic defence manufacturing capabilities and explore alternative sources from other nations. The imposition of tariffs is likely to bolster India’s commitment to achieving self-reliance in defence production.
Conclusion
Operation Sindoor has not only affirmed India’s military capabilities, but also its diplomatic and strategic sophistication. By showcasing the ability to undertake decisive actions while maintaining political equilibrium, India would emerge as a leading security guarantor in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), thereby challenging China’s narrative of being the sole viable alternative.
The cumulative impact of these developments has resulted in a redefined geopolitical order in the Indian Ocean. The United States would secure a stronger position through its renewed partnership with Pakistan, China’s influence in the IOR would reduce, and China’s “String of Pearls’ strategy would stand significantly weakened.
The issue of Trump tariffs serves as a stark reminder of the delicate balance between economic policy, trade relations, and national security, and it should propel India further towards a more self-reliant and diversified defence procurement model.
Unbiased Jottings on Global Maritime Issues 